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Free Speech and the
Myth of the Internet as an
Unintermediated Experience
Christopher S. Yoo*
Introduction
When the Internet first emerged, many commentators hailed its
potential to enable individuals to speak directly to mass audiences
without having to rely on gatekeepers that had long determined the
substance of media content.1  The language of the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Reno v. ACLU2 echoed similar themes when it
lauded how the Internet enables “any person with a phone line” to
become a “pamphleteer” or a “town crier with a voice that resonates
farther than it could from any soapbox.”3  Other commentators were
less optimistic, arguing that regulation might be needed to guarantee
that the Internet represented an unintermediated experience in which
speakers could communicate directly with audiences.4
In recent years, concerns about the role of Internet in-
termediaries have continued to grow.  The debate initially focused on
last-mile broadband providers’ abilities to favor certain content or ap-
plications either by giving them different levels of higher priority or by
* Professor of Law and Communication and Founding Director, Center for Technology,
Innovation, and Competition, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I would like to thank the
Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation for its financial support, as well as participants in
presentations before TPRC’s 37th Research Conference on Communication, Information, and
Internet Policy; the Penn Interactive Media Colloquium sponsored by the Wharton Interactive
Media Initiative; Microsoft’s Legal and Corporate Affairs Department; and the Seton Hall Law
School; as well Eric Goldman, Seth Kreimer, and Mark Nadel for their comments on early drafts
of this Article.  All errors are the responsibility of the author.
1 The classic statement is Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE
L.J. 1805, 1834–38 (1995).  For other similar observations, see, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Kirk J.
Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and
the Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1130–31 (1999); Kathleen M. Sullivan, First
Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1670–73 (1998);
Eli M. Noam, Media Concentration in the United States: Industry Trends and Regulatory Re-
sponses (1996), http://www.vii.org/papers/medconc.htm.
2 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
3 Id. at 870.
4 See, e.g., Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing
the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J.
1619, 1628–29, 1636–37 (1995).
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charging them different amounts.5  The issue came to a head in 2008
when the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) sanctioned
Comcast for slowing down the traffic associated with a single applica-
tion, only to see that decision overturned on judicial review.6  Com-
mentators have also warned of search engines’ abilities to influence
the speech environment by skewing search results.7  Other commenta-
tors have called for mandating open access to key file-sharing and so-
cial networking technologies, such as YouTube, BitTorrent, Facebook,
and MySpace.8  Most recently, controversy has arisen over access to
key device technologies, as demonstrated by the decision of the FCC
to open an investigation into Apple’s decision not to carry certain
voice applications developed by Google.9  Still other commentators
have focused not on these intermediaries’ abilities to shape Internet
speech in accordance with their own views, but rather on the govern-
ment’s ability to impose regulation of intermediaries as an indirect
means for imposing its own speech preferences.10  Newspaper ac-
counts constantly raise concerns about the manner in which in-
5 The initial debate focused on multiple internet service provider (“ISP”) access to cable
modem systems. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving
the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).  More re-
cently, the debate has been framed in terms of network neutrality. See Network Neutrality:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Professor Lawrence Lessig), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/lessig-020
706.pdf; Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141 (2003).
6 Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23
F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008), vacated sub nom. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291, 2010 WL 1286658
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2010).
7 See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1161–79 (2008); Jennifer A.
Chandler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095 (2007); Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeep-
ers and the Right to Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179 (2001).
8 See Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 933,
936–37 (2008); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 996–1002 (2008).
9 See Reed Abelson, F.C.C. Looking into Rejection of Google App for iPhone, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009, at B5.
10 See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6 (2003), http://www.
vjolt.net/vol8/issue2/v8i2_a06-Birnhack-Elkin-Koren.pdf; Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy:
The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 11 (2006); Felix Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity (on
file with author) (paper presented at 2009 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, Aug. 7,
2009).
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termediaries such as Comcast, Google, Facebook, and Apple select
and prioritize content and applications.11
Note that these claims reflect a deep internal inconsistency.
Sometimes the network provider is the actor charged with wielding its
market power in a manner that harms the hapless device and applica-
tion providers.  In other cases, it is the device manufacturer that is
accused of abusing its dominance, while in still other cases it is the
application provider (particularly search engines and social network-
ing software).  Simply put, these claims cannot be advanced simulta-
neously in a coherent manner.  If, in fact, more than one level of this
chain of distribution is dominated by a single player, the economics of
“double marginalization” suggests that consumers would be better off
if both were controlled by a single entity.12
Although the discussion initially focused on the impact that inter-
mediation would have on economic considerations, such as competi-
tion and innovation, more recently scholars have begun framing their
arguments against intermediation in terms of the First Amendment,13
although not in a literal sense.  Under current law, the First Amend-
ment only restricts the actions of state actors and does not restrict the
actions of private actors.14  Thus, under the conventional understand-
ing of the First Amendment, it is governmental attempts to restrict
private actors’ freedom of speech that would be constitutionally prob-
lematic.  Scholars have long advanced theories that would transform
the First Amendment from a negative limitation on government ac-
tion into an affirmative obligation on the government to provide the
means for the meaningful exercise of free speech rights.15  Although
11 See, e.g., Saul Hansell, F.C.C. Vote Sets Precedent on Unfettered Web Usage, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2008, at C1; Joe Nocera, Stuck in Google’s Doghouse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2008, at C1;
Jeffrey Rosen, Google’s Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 30, 2008, at 50; Jenna Wortham,
Even Google Is Blocked with Apps for iPhone, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2009, at B1.
12 See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy,
19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 192–93, 260–61 (2002).
13 See, e.g., DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE
SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE (2009); Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital
Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 428–33 (2009); Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 1188–1201; Bill D.
Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J.
103, 112–19 (2006); Randolph J. May, Net Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment
in the Digital Age, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 197, 202–10 (2007); Hannibal Travis, Of
Blogs, eBooks, and Broadband: Access to Digital Media as a First Amendment Right, 35 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 1519, 1564–81 (2007); Moran Yemini, Mandated Network Neutrality and the First
Amendment: Lessons from Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2008), http://
www.vjolt.net/vol13/issue1/v13i1_a1-Yemini.pdf.
14 See NUNZIATO, supra note 13, at 35–39; Balkin, supra note 13, at 429–30.
15 For the seminal statement of this position, see Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—
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the Supreme Court briefly entertained the possibility that broadcast-
ers and common carriers might be state actors for purposes of the
First Amendment,16 the Court’s later decisions squarely foreclosed
this possibility.17  Despite the best efforts of some advocates to expand
the scope of the First Amendment, it remains a limit on governmental
action that does not reach private action.  As a result, invoking the
First Amendment as requiring governmental intervention to redress
private power would stand the First Amendment on its head.
Instead, these commentators are more properly regarded as of-
fering policy arguments that are informed by the free speech values
embodied in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
As a general matter, proponents of regulating intermediaries con-
tend that the speech interests of those seeking to transmit their con-
tent and applications through the network are the ones that matter.18
A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967). See also OWEN M. FISS, LIBER-
ALISM DIVIDED 15–18 (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 44–45 (paperback ed. 1995).  For proposals to apply this reasoning to the Internet, see
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 164–68 (1999); NUNZIATO, supra
note 13, at 41–69; Herman, supra note 13, at 112.
16 See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952) (holding that the fact that a
street railway operated under the supervision of a public utility commission was sufficient state
action to subject the railway’s decision to play radio programming to First Amendment scrutiny).
In a subsequent decision, the Court split 4–2 on whether broadcasters were state actors. Com-
pare CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 115–21 (1973) (plurality opinion) (con-
cluding that broadcasters are not state actors), and id. at 133–41 (Stewart, J., concurring in part)
(same), and id. at 150 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment) (same), with id. at 172–81 (Bren-
nan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).  Three Justices declined to reach the issue. See id. at
146–47 (White, J., concurring in part); id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring
in part).
17 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352–53 (1974) (holding that rendering
utility services is not sufficient to constitute state action). See generally Christopher S. Yoo, The
Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245,
334 (2003).  For decisions holding that ISPs are not state actors, see Green v. Am. Online
(AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003); Howard v. Am. Online, Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir.
2000); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546 (E.D. Va. 2003); Cyber Promo-
tions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 443–44 (E.D. Pa. 1996).  For decisions holding
that search engines are not state actors, see Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631–32
(D. Del. 2007).  For a decision holding that Yahoo! e-mail groups are not state actors, see
Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F. Supp. 2d 577, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  Another court notes: “Because
these Internet providers are not state actors, they are free to impose content-based restrictions
on access to the Internet without implicating the First Amendment.”  Sanger v. Reno, 966 F.
Supp. 151, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
18 See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 1200; Herman, supra note 13, at 113; Travis,
supra note 13, at 1577; Ex parte Letter from Timothy Wu, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of
Law, and Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y,
FCC 9–10 (Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6514683884
(Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, Declar-
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Such an approach might have been appropriate for person-to-person
communications, as was the case with telephony and the applications
that dominated the early Internet, such as e-mail or file transfers.
When that is the case, these proponents argue that the only free
speech interests at play are those of the end users, not the network
providers.19  As we shall see, the extent to which common carriers pos-
sess First Amendment rights is more uncertain than is generally recog-
nized.20  More importantly for our purposes, the modern Internet is no
longer simply a medium for person-to-person communications.  It is
now perhaps the dominant platform for mass communications.  Mass-
media speech implicates a broader range of free speech values that
include interests of audiences and intermediaries, as well as speakers.
In determining how to balance this more complex array of values,
we can take guidance from a body of knowledge that has not yet been
fully explored in the literature: the Supreme Court’s decisions apply-
ing the First Amendment to mass media, particularly those addressing
the leading historical forms of electronic communication (broadcast-
ing and cable television).  These precedents have long recognized that
the editorial discretion that intermediaries exercise promotes impor-
tant free speech values by helping shield audiences from unwanted
speech and by helping them identify and access desired content.  With
respect to the Internet, intermediaries help protect end users from ex-
posure to spam, pornography, and viruses and other forms of
malware, while helping them sift through the ever-growing avalanche
of desired content that appears on the Internet every day.21  Thus,
courts have recognized that the editorial discretion exercised by
search engines and network providers implicates important free
speech values.22  Indeed, unless one expects all end users to crawl the
atory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002), available at http://
gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514683884.
19 For commentary employing this logic to conclude that telephony does not implicate the
First Amendment, see, e.g., HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW
§ 2.3(A)(3), at 185–89 (1999); C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of
Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 42 n.144 (1976); Daniel Brenner, Telephone Company Entry into
Video Services: A First Amendment Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 125 (1991).
20 See infra Part II.D.
21 See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8
YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 195–96 (2006), http://www.yjolt.org/files/goldman-8-YJOLT-188.pdf;
James Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 939, 941 (2008–2009).
22 See Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 629–30 (search engine); Comcast Cablevision of Brow-
ard County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 693–94 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (cable modem
provider).
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entire web themselves every day, even critics of intermediation have
recognized that it can be beneficial and may be inevitable.23
In short, the image of the Internet as an unintermediated experi-
ence, in which speakers speak directly to audiences without passing
through any gatekeepers, is more myth than reality.  The real question
is not whether some actor, but rather which actor, will serve as the
intermediary.  The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
underscores that important free speech considerations fall on both
sides of the debate over intermediation.24  Moreover, in terms of de-
ciding how that balance should be struck, the cases indicate that free
speech considerations favor preserving intermediaries’ editorial dis-
cretion unless the relevant technologies fall within a narrow range of
exceptions, all of which the Court has found to be inapplicable to the
Internet.  Indeed, Supreme Court precedent recognizes the impor-
tance of this editorial discretion even when intermediaries are simply
serving as the conduit for the speech of others.25  Moreover, the Court
has long held that the fact that an intermediary may wield monopoly
power26 and the danger that intermediaries may act as private cen-
sors27 do not justify regulating their editorial discretion.  That would
substitute government decisionmaking for private decisionmaking,
and although Supreme Court precedent and our free speech traditions
are agnostic as to which private actor should serve as the intermedi-
ary, they are very clear that it should not be the government, and
when choosing between censorship by a private actor and the govern-
ment, the choice should always favor the former over the latter.28
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses
the inevitability of intermediation, both in terms of protecting end
users from exposure to unwanted content and in helping them identify
and obtain access to desirable content.  It also analyzes the manner in
23 See Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy and Free Speech: The First Amendment at War with
Itself, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1211, 1220–23 (2007); Kreimer, supra note 10, at 17; Amit M.
Schejter & Moran Yemini, “Justice, and Only Justice, You Shall Pursue”: Network Neutrality, the
First Amendment and John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
137, 167 (2007); Neil Weinstock Netanel, New Media in Old Bottles? Barron’s Contextual First
Amendment and Copyright in the Digital Age, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952, 968–69 (2008);
Yemeni, supra note 13, at 17–20.
24 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 226–27 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part).
25 See infra notes 106, 166, 249, 260, 262, 265 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 107, 124, 279 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 96, 99–102, 108, 112, 125, 146–49, 168, 261 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124–26 (1973); THOMAS G.
KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 327 (1994).
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which intermediaries may be essential to solving certain bargaining
problems that may prevent end users from obtaining access to the
content they desire.  Part II analyzes the judicial precedents recogniz-
ing the important free speech values promoted by intermediaries’ ex-
ercises of editorial discretion, including the Supreme Court’s decisions
regarding newspapers, broadcasting, and cable television.  It also ex-
amines lower court decisions on dial-a-porn and on telephone compa-
nies’ First Amendment rights to offer video programming to explore
how editorial discretion can promote free speech values even when
exercised by common carriers such as telephone companies.  Part III
reviews the inauspicious history of past attempts to regulate the edito-
rial discretion wielded by electronic intermediaries.  Together, these
insights underscore how Internet intermediaries’ exercises of editorial
discretion can foster rather than impede free speech values.
I. The Benefits and Inevitability of Intermediation
When the Internet first arose, it served primarily as a medium for
person-to-person communications, such as e-mail and file transfers.
Although some forms of mass communications did exist on the early
Internet (such as newsgroups and electronic bulletin boards), they
represented a relatively small proportion of overall Internet traffic.
The nature of the Internet underwent a fundamental change dur-
ing the mid-1990s.  The privatization of the Internet backbone and the
concomitant elimination of the commercialization restrictions trig-
gered an explosion of mass-media web content.
The emergence of the Internet as an important medium for mass
communications effected an equally important shift in the importance
of Internet intermediaries, both in terms of helping end users filter out
bad content and in helping them identify and obtain access to good
content.  In addition, the literature on the economics of intermedia-
tion underscores how intermediaries can play key roles in helping end
users obtain access to the content they desire.  Together, these insights
demonstrate that intermediation should not be regarded as a neces-
sary evil, as some commentators have suggested.  On the contrary, in-
termediation can play a key role in helping end users obtain access to
the content and applications they desire.
A. Controlling Unwanted Content
The emergence of the Internet as an important source of mass-
media content has led end users to look to intermediaries to help insu-
late them against unwanted content (such as spam, malware, and por-
704 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 78:697
nography) and unwanted attacks (such as viruses, Trojan horses, and
other forms of malware).  By the late 1990s, such intermediation was
generally performed by firewall and filtering software installed on the
desktop computers through which end users connected to the In-
ternet.29  Many commentators lauded edge-based filtering as the best
way of ensuring that control over content remained in the hands of
end users.30  Concentrating the intelligence in applications operating
at the edge of the network was also consistent with the end-to-end
argument and the layers principles that many commentators regard as
an essential part of the Internet’s architecture.31
Other commentators took a less sanguine view of edge-based fil-
tering.  Some raised the concern that the introduction of filtering tech-
nologies would inadvertently prevent end users from obtaining access
to benign content and would give the software companies that create
and update the filtering software gatekeeper control over what speech
end users could receive.32  Others observed that widespread deploy-
ment of filtering technologies by end users can facilitate government
control of content.33  Still others warned that widescale deployment of
edge-based filtering would also have the unintended side effect of
skewing innovation.34
29 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S.
656, 667 (2004) (offering a more recent reaffirmation of the edge-based vision of filtering).
30 See, e.g., Berman & Weitzner, supra note 4, at 1632–35; Developments in the Law—The
Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1641 (1999); PICS, Censorship, & Intellectual
Freedom FAQ (Paul Resnick, ed.), http://www.w3.org/PICS/PICS-FAQ-980126.html (last modi-
fied Aug. 4, 1999).
31 On edge-based filtering’s consistency with the end-to-end argument, see, e.g., Lawrence
Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 629, 660 (1998).
On edge-based filtering’s consistency with a layered architecture, see, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum &
Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
815, 892–94 (2004).
32 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regu-
lation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1145–47, 1152–53 (1996); Lessig, supra note 31, at 652–70; Lawrence
Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical Model, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 395, 424–26 (1999); Thomas B. Nachbar, Paradox and Structure: Relying on Government
Regulation to Preserve the Internet’s Unregulated Character, 85 MINN. L. REV. 215 (2000); R.
Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 755 (1999); Jonathan Weinberg,
Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453 (1997); ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., FAULTY
FILTERS: HOW CONTENT FILTERS BLOCK ACCESS TO KID-FRIENDLY INFORMATION ON THE IN-
TERNET (1997), http://epic.org/reports/filter_report.html.
33 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1227 (1998);
Tim Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty?—The Internet and the International System, 10 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 647, 654 (1997); Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 688
(2003).
34 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
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Over time, many firewall and filtering functions have begun to
migrate from the edge of the network into the network itself.  Many
last-mile network providers include proprietary antivirus and firewall
protection as part of the software needed to access their system.  Net-
work providers have also begun building spam and malware filters
into the core of their networks.
The shift of these filtering functions away from the end user into
the network itself is driven in part by the change in the nature of In-
ternet users.  When it first arose, the Internet served primarily as a
means for connecting university-based technologists who shared a
common set of values and enjoyed a fairly high degree of technical
sophistication and institutional support.  Since that time, the Internet
has evolved into a mass-market technology.  The shift to a user base
dominated by nonexperts without any technical support strengthened
the case for transferring more of those functions into the network
itself.35
Another consideration is cost.  Requiring that all filtering occur
at the edge means that the network must bear the full cost of deliver-
ing content even if it is unwanted.  Screening out undesired content at
the earliest possible moment minimizes the consumption of network
resources.  In addition, a filter operating in the core of the network
may be able to take advantage of aggregate information that is un-
available to individual users.36  End-user filters are also more expen-
sive to deploy and maintain, since deploying them requires thousands
of installations and a continuous series of security updates.
Finally, the prevalence of Trojan horses, spyware, key loggers,
and other forms of hostile code have made end users increasingly dis-
trustful of their own computers.37  Although one solution is to attempt
to reclaim control of the end node by making it more secure, an alter-
native solution is to reduce the vulnerability of the end node by out-
CONNECTED WORLD 172–74 (2001); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET (AND
HOW TO STOP IT) 36–61, 101–26 (2008).
35 See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt
Competition?: A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23,
35 (2004); see also Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the Design of the In-
ternet: The End-to-End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, 1 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON IN-
TERNET TECH. 70, 74 (2001), reprinted in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE
INTERNET AND BEYOND 91, 95–96 (Benjamin M. Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 2001).
36 See David D. Clark & Marjory S. Blumenthal, The End-to-End Argument and Applica-
tion Design: The Role of Trust 5, 24 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 35th
Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference), available at http://web.si.umich.edu/
tprc/papers/2007/748/End%202%20end%20and%20trust%2010%20final%20TPRC.pdf.
37 Id. at 16.
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sourcing security functions to servers located in the core of the
network.38
Leading technologists generally recognize that the Internet’s cur-
rent design is not well suited to addressing problems of security.39  As
a recent article in The New York Times reports, the increasing need
for network security has led many technologists to suggest that the
Internet must be redesigned in a way that makes level security and
identity verification more central features of the network.40  For exam-
ple, the National Science Foundation is sponsoring the Global Envi-
ronment for Network Innovations (GENI) and Future Internet
Design (FIND) initiatives to create a new architecture that makes se-
curity a more integral part of the network.41  The 100x100 Clean Slate
Project and Northwestern’s International Center for Advanced In-
ternet Research are pursuing similar goals.42
My point here is not to resolve whether such functions are better
performed by computers operating at the edge of the network or
within the network itself.  Whether network-based or end-user-based
intermediation will ultimately prove the better solution is most likely
a question that cannot be answered a priori.  Considerations such as
deployment costs and scale economies vary over time, which increases
the likelihood that the optimal locus of screening out unwanted con-
tent will vary from context to context.  In addition, the advent of new
technologies, such as video and audio fingerprinting, may cause the
least-cost locus to shift toward the core of the network over time.43
Moreover, the Internet is comprised of an increasingly diverse range
of network technologies, and the intensity of demand varies widely in
different portions of the network.  The decision between the two ap-
proaches also depends on the heterogeneity of what end users regard
as unwanted content.  Network-based solutions are more likely to be
38 Id. at 16–17.
39 See, e.g., Jon M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the
Quest for a Balanced Policy, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 644, 659 (2007), http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/
article/view/154/90.
40 John Markoff, A New Internet?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at A9.
41 See Global Environment for Network Innovations, http://www.geni.net (last visited
Mar. 31, 2010); National Science Foundation, NeTS FIND Initiative, http://www.nets-find.net
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
42 See 100x100 Clean Slate Project, Mission, http://100x100network.org/mission.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2010); Northwestern University Information Technology, iCAIR: International
Center for Advanced Internet Research, http://www.icair.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
43 Justin Hughes, Copyright Enforcement on the Internet—in Three Acts 41, 45–47, 62
(Univ. of Hokkaido Workshop Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.juris.hokudai.ac.jp/
gcoe/article/hughes_4Mar2009.pdf.
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effective with respect to content like spam, from which almost all
users would like to be shielded.  At the same time, network-based so-
lutions may allow less customization by individual users.  As the pro-
portion of end users who may want access to a particular type of
content increases, the balance tends to favor an end-user-based over a
network-based solution.  Indeed, if what end users want is sufficiently
heterogeneous, a nonuniform solution may result, in which the partic-
ular solution would vary from provider to provider.
My point is more limited.  As the existence of controversies over
gatekeeper control even when filters were end-user-based reveals, in-
termediaries will exist regardless of whether filtering technology is
placed at the edge of the network or in its core.  Indeed, the migration
of filtering technologies into the network simply represents a shift in
the locus of intermediation, not the rise of intermediation where pre-
viously there was none.
B. Identifying Good Content
Equally importantly, intermediaries help end users locate and ob-
tain access to content they find desirable.  The privatization of the In-
ternet and the development of the World Wide Web have transformed
the Internet into a vast and vibrant source of media content whose
magnitude grows ever more vast with every passing day.  The broad-
scale deployment of applications associated with Web 2.0, which turn
end users into important generators of content as well as consumers of
content, should dramatically increase both the volume of content
available and the variability of its quality.
End users are unable to sift through the avalanche of new and
existing content that appears on the Internet by themselves.  Instead,
they depend on a wide variety of content aggregators, such as e-mail
bulletins, bloggers, and search engines, to help them identify and re-
trieve content about which they did not previously know, but are
likely to find interesting.  No two such intermediaries are precisely
alike.  Indeed, the content that they select and the manner in which
they present them represent a distinct editorial voice that constitutes
the primary source of value they provide to end users.
Consider Google’s emergence as the leading search engine.
Google was able to displace AltaVista and a host of other well-estab-
lished search engines because it employed an algorithm that did a bet-
ter job in identifying content that end users found interesting.44  Of
44 See Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1334–37 (2008).
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course, Google’s ranking protocol displays results in an order differ-
ent from other search engines, and that fact inevitably favors certain
websites over others.  Although such differentiation inevitably dis-
pleases those Google’s ranking protocol disfavors, these differences
are the key to such intermediaries’ successes.  It is thus hard to see
how to make sense of criticisms that search engine results are “bi-
ased”45 when bias is the very essence of the enterprise.46  Moreover,
compelled adherence to any particular search approach threatens to
limit the benefits they can provide and, to the extent that it would
apply to all search engines and not just Google, would discourage en-
try by narrowing the dimensions along which a new search engine
could compete.47
In addition to vying with their direct competitors, different In-
ternet industry players are vying with providers of complementary ser-
vices to become the intermediary of choice.  Web-error redirection,
which is a new service that has the potential to provide real benefits to
end users, is one such example.  Until recently, when most users mis-
typed a website name into the address line of a browser, the browser
returned a screen indicating “404 Error—File Not Found.”  With in-
creasing frequency, the browser now transmits the mistyped web ad-
dress to a search engine, which in turn suggests alternatives that are
likely to provide the end user with one-click access to the correct ad-
dress.  A struggle has emerged among web-browser providers, search
engines, and last-mile network providers over who will determine the
search engine that will perform this function.
Although some commentators may have strong convictions about
which types of providers may perform particular functions and which
may not,48 I am ultimately agnostic about which type of player should
intermediate this particular transaction.49  For current purposes, my
more limited point is the inevitability that some firm will intermediate
end users’ access to content.  This emerging competition among differ-
45 See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 1167–71; Chandler, supra note 7, at 1105; Elkin-
Koren, supra note 7, at 187–91.
46 See Goldman, supra note 21, at 195–98; Ellen P. Goodman, No Time for Equal Time: A
Comment on Professor Magarian’s Substantive Media Regulation in Three Dimensions, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 897, 910–12 (2008).
47 See James Grimmelmann, Don’t Censor Search, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 48 (2007),
http://thepocketpart.org/ylj-online/intellectual-property/582-dont-censor-search.
48 See, e.g., Ed Felten, Verizon Violates Net Neutrality with DNS Deviations, posting to
Freedom to Tinker (Nov. 12, 2007, 11:02 AM), http://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/verizon-
violates-net-neutrality-dns-deviations.
49 Indeed, attempts by industry players to expand into adjacent markets may represent the
best available form of rivalry on the Internet. See Yoo, supra note 12, at 282–85.
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ent types of network players underscores that the choice is not be-
tween intermediation and nonintermediation, but rather which firm
will serve as the intermediary.  Preventing any particular player from
serving as the intermediary will simply transfer those functions to an-
other player.
C. The Potential Benefits of Intermediation
In addition to helping end users screen out bad content and lo-
cate and access good content, intermediaries can play a number of
beneficial economic roles.  Although the Internet is often described as
if it were a unified system, it is actually a combination of autonomous
systems interacting through a web of interconnection agreements.
Each autonomous system makes its own independent decisions about
the other networks with which it will interconnect and determines the
terms of interconnection with those networks through arms-length
negotiations.
The result is that similar content may take radically different
paths through the network, depending on the particular interconnec-
tion arrangements that their network provider has negotiated.  In ad-
dition, the price that particular traffic will pay will vary, depending on
the precise terms negotiated in the interconnection agreements.50
Most importantly, reliance on arms-length negotiations makes it inevi-
table that the terms of interconnection will depend in no small part on
whatever bargaining power that the various network participants may
possess.  Indeed, short-run exercises of bargaining power play an im-
portant role in reallocating resources and in providing incentives for
markets in long-run disequilibrium to reequilibrate.  As a general mat-
ter, so long as competitive entry in that particular segment of the in-
dustry is feasible, any supracompetitive returns should prove to be
short-lived.  Regulatory interventions that prevent the realization of
such short-run returns would thus have the unfortunate effect of
short-circuiting the market from reallocating resources to their highest
and best use.51
That said, the economic literature has identified conditions that
cause such negotiated outcomes to deviate from the long-run opti-
mum.  As the following Sections will discuss in greater detail, the
number of players, asymmetric information, and the ability to act op-
50 See Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture that Challenge the Sta-
tus Quo, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 80, 85–90, 95–99 (2010).
51 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9–10,
29–33, 48–53 (2005).
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portunistically can cause parties to fail to reach agreement even when
doing so would be in their mutual best interest.  The literature also
recognizes that intermediaries can help solve these market failures.52
1. Multiparty Bargaining
One of the classic ways that bargaining can fail is when it necessa-
rily involves a multitude of parties.  At a minimum, the sheer friction
of bringing together and negotiating with multiple parties increases
the transaction costs of multiparty bargaining.53  In addition, parties to
a multiparty bargain have the incentive to free ride or to hold out in
order to capture a greater proportion of the available surplus.54
One classic solution to the problems associated with multiparty
bargaining is to have the government serve as an intermediary by im-
posing a liability rule, which forecloses opportunistic behavior by es-
tablishing a price at which the bargain will take place.55  Subsequent
work has shown that the intermediary need not be the government.
Robert Merges’s classic work “Contracting into Liability Rules” pro-
vides rich and important examples in which the parties created private
intermediaries to solve multiparty bargaining problems.56  That said,
private intermediation should not be regarded as a panacea.  Indeed,
scholars have explored the circumstances in which such privately cre-
ated collective solutions are likely to fail.57  The possibility that such
collective solutions might fail does not, however, justify rejecting pri-
vate intermediation out of hand.  Particularly when combined with the
threat that governmental intermediation can pose to free speech, dis-
cussed below, the benefits of private intermediation suggest that it
should be encouraged whenever possible.
52 For a nontechnical overview of the economic roles played by intermediaries, see Daniel
F. Spulber, Market Microstructure and Intermediation, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1996, at 135.
See also Thomas F. Cotter, Some Observations on the Law and Economics of Intermediaries,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 69–74 (2006).
53 See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 46–48 (1965).
54 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 105–09
(1962).
55 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–07 (1972).
56 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
57 For the classic analyses, see generally GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY
RIGHTS (1989); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITU-
TIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
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2. Asymmetric Information
Intermediaries can also solve another classic problem that can
prevent bargaining from reaching efficient solutions: informational
asymmetry.58  Informational asymmetry occurs when one or both par-
ties have private information that the other party cannot verify.59  Two
parties that are bargaining must perform two distinct functions.  First,
they must determine whether gains from trade exist and, if so, how
best to maximize them.  In this aspect of the bargaining process, the
parties’ interests are aligned, since both benefit from ensuring that the
surplus they will divide is as large as possible.  Second, they must de-
termine how to divide the surplus created by their bargain.  In this
aspect of the bargaining process, the zero-sum aspect of the surplus
division makes the parties’ interests quite divergent.
If both parties had complete information, the parties would re-
solve both functions fairly easily.  Perfect knowledge of each other’s
reservation prices would allow both parties to determine whether
gains from trade exist.  In addition, perfect knowledge of each other’s
bargaining power would provide guidance as to how to divide the sur-
plus.  The situation is quite different when one or both parties have
private information.  In that case, the parties must communicate some
of that private information to one another in order for them to deter-
mine whether a mutually beneficial bargain exists and how to divide
up the benefits created by that bargain.60
The problem is that revealing the private information needed to
determine whether a mutually beneficial agreement exists affects the
manner in which the parties will divide up the surplus created by the
agreement.  Thus, the information that each party chooses to reveal
involves a profit-maximizing tradeoff.  On the one hand, candidly dis-
closing the party’s true valuation increases the likelihood that the par-
ties will identify a mutually beneficial bargain if one exists, but
reduces the proportion of the available surplus that the party will
claim should an agreement be reached.  This provides the parties with
the incentive to misrepresent their true valuations.  Knowing that the
other party has the incentive to misrepresent its true valuations in this
manner means that both parties will greet the other side’s representa-
58 The literature on bargaining in the face of informational asymmetry is vast.  For a brief
overview, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 361–88 (1988).
59 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IM-
PLICATIONS 31–35 (1975).
60 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA.
L. REV. 323, 332 (1994).
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tions with skepticism unless backed up by actions.61  At best, this in-
creases the costs of reaching agreement.  At worst, it prevents a
welfare-enhancing agreement from being reached at all.  A similar
problem arises when multiple parties are bargaining for the same as-
set.  The bidding rules may give both parties the incentive to misrepre-
sent their preferences.  This can cause the resource not to be allocated
to its highest and best use.62
Economists have long recognized that intermediaries can solve
the problems of asymmetric information.  Precommitment to a mech-
anism that allocates the surplus in the same way that would occur
under perfect information can induce both parties to reveal their pri-
vate information truthfully.63  Once the private information has been
revealed, both parties have incentives to attempt to renegotiate the
deal.  Thus, the intermediary must have the authority to enforce the
mechanism in order to prevent it from unraveling.
Such problems are likely to exist with respect to the Internet and
are likely to become more acute as the Internet becomes more com-
plex.  Unlike previous networks, the Internet is not owned or man-
aged by a single entity.  Instead, it consists of a series of
interconnected autonomous systems.  Because each interconnection
agreement is negotiated through arms-length bargaining, the Internet
represents precisely the type of market in which asymmetric informa-
tion is likely to cause problems.  If so, the best solution will often be
an intermediary that can make a credible commitment to follow a
pricing mechanism sufficient to induce both parties to reveal the in-
tensity of their preferences.
3. Two-Sided Markets
The insights of the emerging field of two-sided markets further
increase the likelihood that intermediation is likely to play a key role
on the Internet.64  The literature on network economic effects has long
61 See Peter C. Cramton, Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon
Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 579, 581 (1984).
62 For a useful illustration, see DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY
280–91 (1990).
63 The literature on mechanism design is vast.  The seminal contribution is Roger B. Myer-
son & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY
265 (1983).  For a survey, see DREW FUDENBURG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 243–318
(1991).  For an accessible description appearing in the legal literature, see Eric L. Talley, Note,
Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1195, 1220–24 (1994).
64 For surveys of the literature on two-sided markets, see Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean
Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006); Roberto Roson,
2010] Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet 713
recognized that the value of communication is determined in large
part by the total number of users connected to the network.65  For
example, the value of the telephone network to a particular customer
depends on the number of other customers she can reach through it.66
Another classic example arose during the struggle between the Beta
and VHS standards for video cassette recorders (“VCR”).67  Despite
the heated debates at the time, most users did not base their decision
on each technology’s relative technical merits or even its cost.  Pro-
spective adopters cared most about which type of VCR most other
consumers would adopt.  In short, the value to consumers was deter-
mined almost exclusively by which VCR standard would have the
larger network.68
Some networks, however, may be comprised of two distinct clas-
ses of users, with the value of the network to any particular user de-
pending not on the total number of other users, but rather only on the
number of users of the other class.  When this is the case, the market
is said to be a “two-sided market.”69  Consider the example of a sin-
gles club or a singles bar for heterosexuals, in which the universe of
customers is comprised of two classes of members: males and females.
In this case, the value of the club to any particular member is not
determined by the total size of the club, but rather the number of club
members of the other gender.70
Credit cards are another classic example of a two-sided market.
Credit card networks bring together two types of network partici-
pants: merchants and retail customers.  The value of a credit card net-
work to merchants depends on the number of retail purchasers
belonging to the network.  The number of other merchants on the net-
work is not important in and of itself, but rather only to the extent it
Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey, 4 REV. NETWORK ECON. 142 (2005), http://www.bepress.
com/rne/vol4/iss2/3.
65 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Com-
patibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985).
66 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 179, 223 n.139 (collecting sources).
67 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1847, 1889 n.200 (2006).
68 See id. at 1889–92; Yoo, supra note 12, at 278–82.
69 See Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668, 668
(2006); Roson, supra note 64, at 142, 144.
70 See Armstrong, supra note 69, at 668; David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of
Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE. J. ON REG. 325, 327–28 (2003).  Although the value may
increase given an increase in the number of members of the other class, the value may decrease
given an increase in the number of members of the same class, which would intensify
competition.
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provides incentives for additional retail customers to belong to the
same credit card network.  Conversely, retail customers care primarily
about the number of merchants that are part of the network rather
than the number of other retail customers (although, again, increases
in the number of retail customers on the network may provide incen-
tives for more merchants to join).71
Another example is broadcast television networks, which bring
together two classes of customers: advertisers and viewers.  Advertis-
ers focus not on the number of other advertisers, but rather on the
number of viewers.72  In each of these examples, it is the number of
network participants of the other class that determines the value of
the network, not the total number of network users.
Two-sided markets have a number of distinctive characteristics.
For example, two-sided markets suffer from what has been called the
classic “chicken and egg problem”: stated in terms of the credit card
example given above, retail customers will not carry a credit card un-
less it is accepted by a large number of merchants, while merchants
will not agree to take the card unless a large number of retail custom-
ers already carry it.  Under these circumstances, an intermediary may
be able to play a key role by using innovative pricing strategies to get
both sides of the two-sided market on board.73
Although the precise determinants of optimal prices are complex,
the prices charged to each side of the market tend to be asymmetric,
with one side often being charged little or nothing for its participa-
tion.74  For example, in singles bars, admission prices for males are
often much higher than prices for females.75  In credit card networks,
merchants are charged on a per-transaction basis, while retail custom-
71 For the seminal analysis, see generally William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transac-
tional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541 (1983) (describing the incen-
tive structure of credit card market participants). See also Jean-Charles Rochet, The Theory of
Interchange Fees: A Synthesis of Recent Contributions, 2 REV. NETWORK ECON. 97 (2003), http://
www.bepress.com/rne/vol2/iss2/4.
72 Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality After Comcast: Toward a Case-by-Case Ap-
proach to Network Management, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 558, 723–74
(Randolph J. May ed., 2009).
73 See Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermedia-
tion Service Providers, 34 RAND J. ECON. 309, 310–11, 322–23 (2003); Jean-Charles Rochet &
Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990, 990, 1013,
1018 (2003).
74 See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets
with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151, 155 (2007); Rochet & Tirole, supra
note 73, at 1013–17.
75 See Evans, supra note 70, at 327.
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ers are not (although retail customers may have to pay a membership
fee).76  Moreover, the welfare-maximizing prices generally do not
cover the costs.  As a result, a firm intermediating a two-sided market
may have to engage in Ramsey pricing or some similar form of price
discrimination in order to be sustainable.77
In addition, the prices on each side of a two-sided market are
interdependent.  Any force that tends to raise the margins on one side
of a two-sided market will tend to push down prices on the other side.
That is because if activities become more profitable on one side of the
market, it pays to promote connectivity on the other side.  This gives
rise to what Rochet and Tirole have called the “seesaw principle.”78
Indeed, it is quite common for prices on one side of a two-sided mar-
ket to be below marginal cost or even zero.79  Indeed, activities on one
side of a two-sided market may become so profitable that that side
may find it beneficial to subsidize customers on the other side of the
market by paying them to participate in the network.80
The dynamics that lead to this cross-subsidization are well illus-
trated by the economics of broadcast television.81  For decades, the
standard arrangement for broadcast television networks has been to
pay local television stations to serve as their affiliates.82  This is be-
cause the primary revenue model for broadcast television was based
on national advertising inserted into the programming provided by the
television network.  The fact that the value to advertisers increased
with the number of viewers meant it made economic sense for the
television network to subsidize the connectivity of viewers, since they
would make whatever money they had to pay back in increased adver-
tising prices.83
76 See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 73, at 1013–14.
77 See Wilko Bolt & Alexander F. Tieman, Social Welfare and Cost Recovery in Two-Sided
Markets, 5 REV. NETWORK ECON. 103, 115 (2006), http://www.bepress.com/rne/vol5/iss1/7/;
Roson, supra note 64, at 148; Bruno Jullien, Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries
12–13 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1345, 2004), available at http://SSRN.com/abstract=634212;
see also Victor P. Goldberg & Richard A. Epstein, Introductory Remarks: Some Reflections on
Two-Sided Markets and Pricing, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 509, 510 (arguing that price discrimi-
nation will likely emerge).
78 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 64, at 659.
79 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 74, at 152; Rochet & Tirole, supra note 64, at
658–60, 665; Jullien, supra note 77, at 8.
80 Caillaud & Jullien, supra note 73, at 310, 314, 324; Goldberg & Epstein, supra note 77,
at 510; Roson, supra note 64, at 147–48.
81 See Yoo, supra note 51, at 73–74.
82 Id. at 74.
83 Id.
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Equally interesting is the manner in which this business practice
has changed over time.  Networks began to vary the prices paid by
asking weaker stations to accept lower payments.84  More recently,
networks have begun to refuse to pay the weakest stations at all.  In-
stead, they have insisted that the stations will have to begin paying the
network if they are to remain affiliated with the network.85  Business
models based on advertising make it likely that these types of pay-
ments will occur.  The broadcasting example shows that the magnitude
and even the direction of the payments will vary across different sta-
tions and across time.
Most of the implications drawn from the broadcast television ex-
ample apply to the modern Internet.86  The fact that advertising reve-
nue flows to content providers increases the likelihood that the
optimal solution would be for content providers to make side pay-
ments to last-mile providers to subsidize the connectivity of end users.
Although the practice of backbone peering has historically foreclosed
such side payments from flowing through the contracts established by
the network, the emergence of new interconnection arrangements,
such as “paid peering,” will solve that problem, assuming that network
neutrality regulation does not foreclose such practices.87  In addition,
the economics of two-sided markets also underscores the importance
of facilitating price flexibility, so that the platform provider can get
both sides of the market on board and engage in some form of Ram-
sey-style pricing to cover their costs.
Although the literature typically presumes that some firm will
serve as a third-party intermediary that brings both sides of the two-
sided market together,88 it need not necessarily be so.  As a theoretical
matter, parties on either side of a two-sided market may contract in a
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 71–76; Yoo, supra note 66, at 222–27.
87 See Peyman Faratin et al., The Growing Complexity of Internet Interconnection, 72
COMM. & STRATEGIES 51, 58–61 (2008).  For other analyses applying the economics of two-sided
markets to the Internet, see Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Prod-
uct-Line Restrictions with an Application to the Network Neutrality Debate, 19 INFO. ECON. &
POL’Y 215 (2007); John Musacchio et al., A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider Investment
Incentive with an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue, 8 REV. NETWORK ECON. 22 (2009),
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=rne; J. Gregory Sidak, A
Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 349, 361–62 (2006); and ANDREA RENDA, CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD., I OWN THE
PIPES, YOU CALL THE TUNE: THE NET NEUTRALITY DEBATE AND ITS (IR)RELEVANCE FOR EU-
ROPE 11–15 (2008), available at http://www.ceps.be/ceps/download/1579.
88 See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 69, at 668; Rochet & Tirole, supra note 64, at 645.
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decentralized manner so long as a standardized interface exists to
structure their transactions.  That said, the presence of large parties
and asymmetric information make third-party intermediation the
more likely outcome.89  Indeed, a network player such as an internet
service provider (“ISP”) may be the only player in a position to bring
both sides of the market together.90
Intermediaries can thus create new solutions to a wide range of
potential bargaining problems associated with multiparty bargaining,
asymmetric information, and two-sided markets.  Intermediation has
its costs as well.  The optimal level of intermediation thus represents
an extension of the Coasean theory of the firm and should exist when-
ever the costs of direct exchange exceed the costs of intermediation.91
The continued persistence of Internet intermediaries, however, sug-
gests that intermediation provides real benefits in a significant number
of cases.  The complexity of the calculus makes it difficult to predict
which intermediaries are likely to provide the greatest benefits.92
II. Judicial Decisions Recognizing Intermediation and Editorial
Discretion as Promoting Important Free Speech Values
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that intermediaries can
promote end users’ abilities to obtain access to the speech that they
want and only the speech that they want in a wide variety of ways.
They can help shield end users from unwanted content.  They play an
essential role in helping end users identify and obtain access to desired
content.  They can help mitigate bargaining problems that can prevent
end users from obtaining access to the content that they seek.
This Part extends this analysis by analyzing the Supreme Court’s
mass media precedents.  Section A analyzes the Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence with respect to newspapers, which the Court’s decisions
recognize as the baseline standard.  These decisions firmly reject any
attempt to interfere with newspapers’ editorial discretion, even if the
newspaper is the only such outlet available in that geographic area
and despite the fact that the newspaper might exercise its editorial
discretion to favor certain perspectives and disfavor others.
89 See Daniel F. Spulber, Firms and Networks in Two-Sided Markets, in 1 HANDBOOKS IN
INFORMATION SYSTEMS: ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 137, 141–48, 152 (Terrence
Hendershott ed., 2006).
90 See RENDA, supra note 87, at 11.
91 See DANIEL F. SPULBER, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE: INTERMEDIARIES AND THE THE-
ORY OF THE FIRM 345–47 (1999).
92 See Cotter, supra note 52, at 73–74.
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Sections B and C analyze how the Supreme Court has applied
these principles to the leading forms of electronic communication
prior to the Internet: broadcasting and cable television.  These prece-
dents uniformly recognize that intermediaries’ exercises of editorial
discretion promote free speech values even if these actors simply
serve as the conduit for others’ speech, and even if they exercise their
editorial discretion to give preference to particular points of view.
Section D analyzes how these free speech principles have been
extended beyond mass media to common-carriage technologies, such
as telephony.  The cases suggest that common carriers have the right
to exercise some degree of editorial discretion over the messages that
they carry.  In addition, to the extent that common carriers decide to
offer more than just person-to-person communications and begin to
offer mass media content, they are entitled to full First Amendment
protection.
Together, this corpus of judicial decisions provides a powerful
demonstration of how intermediaries’ exercises of editorial discretion
promote important free speech values.  It also eloquently illustrates
the potential harms to free speech that can arise if that editorial dis-
cretion is curtailed.
A. Newspapers as the Free Speech Baseline
The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the free speech rights
of newspapers consistently recognize the paramount nature of news-
papers’ editorial discretion.  For example, in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee (CBS v. DNC),93 a plurality of the Court con-
trasted the editorial discretion of broadcasters with that of newspapers
by setting the editorial discretion of newspapers outside of govern-
mental interference.  The plurality opinion noted, “The power of a
privately owned newspaper to advance its own political, social, and
economic views is bounded by only two facts: first, the acceptance of a
sufficient number of readers—and hence advertisers—to assure finan-
cial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its editors and
publishers.”94  Justice Stewart’s partial concurrence similarly con-
cluded that the First Amendment “gives every newspaper the liberty
to print what it chooses and reject what it chooses, free from the intru-
sive editorial thumb of the Government.”95
93 CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (CBS v. DNC), 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
94 Id. at 117 (plurality opinion).
95 Id. at 145 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Any alleged bias on the part of the reporters did not justify gov-
ernmental intervention.  A majority of the Court later explicitly
noted:
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and edit-
ing is selection and choice of material.  That editors—news-
paper or broadcast—can and do abuse this power is beyond
doubt, but that is no reason to deny the discretion Congress
provided.  Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to
preserve higher values.96
Even the Justices who refused to join the majority opinion ac-
knowledged the importance of preserving newspapers’ editorial dis-
cretion.  In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Douglas
noted:
It would come as a surprise to the public as well as to pub-
lishers and editors of newspapers to be informed that a
newly created federal bureau would hereafter provide
“guidelines” for newspapers or promulgate rules that would
give a federal agency power to ride herd on the publishing
business to make sure that fair comment on all current issues
was made.97
Douglas firmly rejected any claim that allegations of editorial bias
justified regulatory intervention.  After citing Thomas Emerson’s op-
position to “‘forcing newspapers to . . . print all viewpoints’” and Ben-
jamin Franklin’s rejection of forcing publishers to open their columns
“‘to any and all controversialists’” on the simple grounds that a
“‘newspaper was not a stagecoach,’”98 Douglas concluded:
Some newspapers in our history have exerted a powerful—
and some have thought—a harmful interest on the public
mind.  But even Thomas Jefferson, who knew how base and
obnoxious the press could be, never dreamed of interfering.
For he thought that government control of newspapers
would be the greater of two evils.99
Thus, Jefferson concluded the “‘putrid state’” into which newspa-
pers had passed remained “‘an evil for which there is no remedy, our
liberty depends on the freedom of the press.’”100
96 Id. at 124–25 (plurality opinion).
97 Id. at 150–51 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
98 Id. at 151–52.
99 Id. at 152–53.
100 Id. at 153.
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The fact that the editorial discretion wielded by newspaper pub-
lishers might result in a form of private censorship did not justify regu-
latory intervention.  Douglas noted, “Of course there is private
censorship in the newspaper field.  But for one publisher who may
suppress a fact, there are many who will print it.  But if the Govern-
ment is the censor, administrative fiat, not freedom of choice, carries
the day.”101  Douglas continued, “Both TV and radio news broadcasts
frequently tip the news one direction or another . . . .  Yet so do the
newspapers and the magazines and other segments of the press.  The
standards of TV, radio, newspapers, or magazines—whether of excel-
lence or mediocrity—are beyond the reach of Government.”102
Justice Brennan’s dissent, in which Justice Marshall joined, simi-
larly concluded that any attempt to require newspapers to carry edito-
rial advertisements would violate the First Amendment.103  Thus,
despite the Court’s disagreement on other issues, it was unanimous in
endorsing the importance of preserving newspapers’ editorial discre-
tion and in rejecting arguments that alleged bias on the part of those
editors justified restricting it.
The Court reiterated these principles later that same year in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,104 which remains perhaps the
Court’s most definitive endorsement of the importance of preserving
newspapers’ editorial discretion.  In that case, the Court unanimously
invalidated a Florida right-of-reply statute because it represented an
impermissible “intrusion into the function of editors.”105  The Court
elaborated:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for
news, comment, and advertising.  The choice of material to
go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to the limita-
tions on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of
public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—
constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment.106
101 Id.
102 Id. at 155; accord id. at 165 (“The Government’s power to censor the press was abol-
ished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. . . .  Only a free
and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.”); Yale Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 414 U.S. 914, 916–17 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing “the inevitable danger
resulting from placing [censorship] powers in governmental hands”).
103 CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 182 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
105 Id. at 258.
106 Id.
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The wave of newspaper bankruptcies that had rendered most cit-
ies one-newspaper towns was not enough to vitiate this conclusion.107
Nor was the fact that newspapers may collapse into “a homogeneity of
editorial opinion, commentary, and interpretive analysis” or may be
subject to “abuses of bias and manipulative reportage.”108  In the
words of the Court, “[a] responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable
goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and
like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.”109
Justice White’s concurring opinion echoed the same concerns.
Using language that would later be endorsed by the entire Court,110
Justice White began by noting:
According to our accepted jurisprudence, the First Amend-
ment erects a virtually insurmountable barrier between gov-
ernment and the print media as far as government
tampering, in advance of publication, with [sic] news and edi-
torial content is concerned.  A newspaper or magazine is not
a public utility subject to “reasonable” governmental regula-
tion in matters affecting the exercise of journalistic judgment
as to what shall be printed. . . .  Regardless of how benefi-
cent-sounding the purpose of controlling the press might be,
we prefer “the power of reason as applied through public
discussion” and remain intensely skeptical about those mea-
sures that would allow government to insinuate itself into the
editorial rooms of this Nation’s press.111
The potential lack of balance or bias did not justify governmental
intervention:
Of course, the press is not always accurate, or even responsi-
ble, and may not present full and fair debate on important
public issues.  But the balance struck by the First Amend-
ment with respect to the press is that society must take the
risk that occasionally debate on vital maters will not be com-
prehensive and that all viewpoints may not be expressed. . . .
Any other accommodation—any other system that would
supplant private control of the press with the heavy hand of
government intrusion—would make the government the cen-
sor of what the people may read and know.112
107 Id. at 249, 251, 253.
108 Id. at 250.
109 Id. at 256.
110 See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1976).
111 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 259 (White, J., concurring) (citation and footnote omitted) (quoting
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
112 Id. at 260.
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The inviolability of newspapers’ editorial discretion was echoed
in the Court’s subsequent opinions.  For example, in Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Human Relations Commission,113 the Court “reaffirm[ed] un-
equivocally the protection afforded to editorial judgment and to the
free expression of views on these and other issues, however controver-
sial.”114  Justice Stewart’s dissent, in which Justice Douglas joined,
echoed this view, noting that no “governmental agency—local, state,
or federal—can tell a newspaper in advance what it can print and what
it cannot.”115
Similarly, in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,116 the
Court recognized that regulation to ensure “a balanced presentation
of information on issues of public importance . . . has never been al-
lowed with respect to the print media.”117  The Court further noted
that newspaper publishers enjoy “the absolute freedom to advocate
[their] own positions without also presenting opposing viewpoints.”118
The Court again endorsed the importance of preserving the edi-
torial independence of newspapers in Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC (Turner I),119 in which the Court observed that “Tornillo
affirmed an essential proposition: The First Amendment protects the
editorial independence of the press.”120  The Court reiterated “that
right-of-reply statutes . . . are an impermissible intrusion on newspa-
pers’ ‘editorial control and judgment.’”121  In contrasting newspaper
monopolies with cable monopolies, the Court explicitly recognized
that the mere fact that a particular newspaper was the only such outlet
in a particular city did not justify requiring it to carry additional view-
points, noting, “[a] daily newspaper, no matter how secure its local
monopoly, does not possess the power to obstruct readers’ access to
other competing publications.”122
Moreover, in Arkansas Education Television Commission v.
Forbes,123 the Court recognized that “choos[ing] among speakers ex-
pressing different viewpoints” represented an essential part of what
113 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
114 Id. at 391.
115 Id. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
116 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
117 Id. at 377.
118 Id. at 380.
119 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
120 Id. at 653.
121 Id. (quoting Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
122 Id. at 656.
123 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
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newspaper (and broadcast) editors do.124  By reiterating the language
from CBS v. DNC, the Court reaffirmed that the fact that editors
might favor certain viewpoints and disfavor others did not justify im-
posing regulation: “‘That editors . . . can and do abuse this power is
beyond doubt,’ but ‘[c]alculated risks of abuse are taken in order to
preserve higher values.’”125
B. The Importance and Limits of Editorial Discretion Exercised
by Broadcasters
Supreme Court precedent thus uniformly recognized the critical
role that preserving newspapers’ editorial discretion plays in promot-
ing and preserving free speech values.  As phrases such as “absolute
freedom”126 and “virtually insurmountable barrier”127 suggest, this dis-
cretion was inviolable even if a particular newspaper wielded de facto
monopoly power and regardless of how biased or skewed the editorial
policies of a particular newspaper might be.128
The Court was soon called upon to determine the extent to which
these principles applied to broadcasting, which was the first important
form of electronic mass communications to appear on the scene.  The
Court’s decisions employed language that was quite similar to that in
its newspaper precedents, offering numerous powerful endorsements
of the importance of according broadcasters editorial discretion.  In-
deed, the broadcast decisions clearly regard the newspaper standard
as the baseline against which broadcast regulations are measured.
Nonetheless, the Court recognized two exceptions that justified
upholding regulations that clearly would have been impermissible if
imposed on newspapers: the alleged scarcity of the electromagnetic
spectrum and the supposed pervasiveness and accessibility of broad-
cast programming.  Subsequent scholarship has raised serious ques-
tions about the conceptual viability of those rationales even with
respect to broadcasting.  More importantly, the Court has already
held both of these rationales inapplicable to the Internet.  Precedent
has thus already foreclosed any possibility that the exceptions recog-
124 Id. at 673.
125 Id. at 673–74 (citation omitted) (quoting CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 124, 125 (1973)).
126 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984).
127 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974).
128 See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673–74; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 249–51, 253, 256; id. at 260 (White,
J., concurring); CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 124–25; id. at 152–53, 155 (Douglas, J., concurring in
the judgment).
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nized by the broadcast precedents might justify upholding restrictions
on Internet providers’ editorial discretion.
1. The Importance of Broadcasters’ Editorial Discretion
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the editorial discre-
tion exercised by broadcasters serves important free speech values
that would be compromised if broadcasters were forced to make their
networks available to all comers on a nondiscriminatory basis.  The
Court offered its first extensive elaboration of these principles in CBS
v. DNC, in which the Court rejected claims that a broadcaster’s re-
fusal to sell time to editorial advertisements violated the federal com-
munications laws or the First Amendment.129
The Court began its resolution of the statutory claim by examin-
ing the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927,130 which estab-
lished the basic principles governing broadcast regulation.  As the
Court noted, when enacting the Radio Act of 1927, “Congress specifi-
cally dealt with—and firmly rejected—the argument that the broad-
cast facilities should be open on a nonselective basis to all persons
wishing to talk about public issues.”131  Instead, “in the area of discus-
sion of public issues Congress chose to leave broad journalistic discre-
tion with the licensee.”132
Certain members of Congress argued that failure to place limits
on broadcasters’ editorial discretion would give them the power of
“private censorship.”133  To combat that concern, the bill reported by
the Senate Commerce Committee included a provision that would
have limited broadcasters’ editorial discretion by requiring them to
carry all political speech on a nondiscriminatory basis.134  Senator Dill,
who was the principal architect of the Radio Act of 1927, pushed
through an amendment deleting this provision, arguing that “‘it
seemed unwise to put the broadcaster under the hampering control of
being a common carrier and compelled to accept anything and every-
thing that was offered him so long as the price was paid.’”135  Senator
Dill also emphasized how difficult a right of nondiscriminatory access
129 CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 121.
130 Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)).
131 CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 105.
132 Id.
133 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 69-404, at 18 (1927) (minority report); 67 CONG. REC. 5483,
5484 (1926) (statement of Rep. Davis)).
134 Id. at 105–06.
135 Id. at 106 (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12,502 (1926) (statement of Sen. Dill)).
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would be to administer.136  Instead of creating a mandatory right of
access to political speech, Congress enacted a more limited provision
simply requiring that broadcasters who accept advertisements from a
candidate give equal opportunities to other candidates for the same
public office.137
Congress placed the same high value on broadcasters’ exercise of
editorial discretion when it replaced the Radio Act of 1927 with the
Communications Act of 1934.138  When reenacting the provision from
the Radio Act of 1927 described above, Congress rejected a proposal
that would have required any broadcaster permitting their station to
be used for the presentation of views on a public issue to be voted
upon at an upcoming election to afford equal opportunity for the pres-
entation of opposing views on that public question.139  According to
the Court, enactment of that provision “would have imposed a limited
obligation on broadcasters to turn over their microphones to persons
wishing to speak out on certain public issues.”140  Even more impor-
tantly, Congress enacted a provision specifically providing that “‘a
person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not . . . be deemed a com-
mon carrier.’”141
Congress’s commitment to protecting broadcasters’ editorial dis-
cretion was reinforced by statutory provisions prohibiting the FCC
from exercising the power of censorship over broadcasters or from
interfering with broadcasters’ free speech rights.142  The Court noted
that, “[c]onsistent with that philosophy, the Commission on several
occasions has ruled that no private individual or group has a right to
command the use of broadcast facilities.  Congress has not yet seen fit
to alter that policy . . . .”143  The Court construed the Communications
Act of 1934 as “evinc[ing] a legislative desire to preserve values of
private journalism” and “to permit private broadcasting to develop
with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obliga-
tions.”144  “Since it is physically impossible to provide time for all
136 Id. at 106–07 (citing 67 CONG. REC. 12,504 (1926) (statement of Sen. Dill)).
137 Id. at 107 (citing Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 315(a)).
138 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153).
139 CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 107–08 & n.4 (citing Hearings on S. 2910 Before the S. Comm.
on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1934)).
140 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-1918, at 49 (1934) (Conf. Rep.)).
141 Id. at 108–09 (quoting Communications Act of 1934, § 3(h), 48 Stat. at 1066 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 153(10)).
142 Id. at 110 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 326).
143 Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
144 Id. at 109–10.
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viewpoints, . . . the right to exercise editorial judgment was granted to
the broadcaster.”145  Although this editorial discretion raises the possi-
bility that a “‘single person or group [could] place themselves in [a]
position where they can censor the material which shall be broad-
casted to the public,’”146 “Congress appears to have concluded . . . that
of these two choices—private or official censorship—Government
censorship would be the most pervasive, the most self-serving, the
most difficult to restrain and hence the one most to be avoided.”147
The Court further underscored the important free speech values
served by broadcasters’ exercises of editorial discretion when discuss-
ing the First Amendment claim.  The Court rejected arguments that
giving speakers unfettered access to broadcast networks would pro-
mote free speech values, overturning in the process “the Court of Ap-
peals’s view that every potential speaker is ‘the best judge’ of what the
listening public ought to hear or indeed the best judge of the merits of
his or her views.”148  The Court concluded:
All journalistic tradition and experience is to the contrary.
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and edit-
ing is selection and choice of material.  That editors . . . can
and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is no rea-
son to deny the discretion Congress provided.  Calculated
risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values.
The presence of these risks is nothing new; the authors of the
Bill of Rights accepted the reality that these risks were evils
for which there was no acceptable remedy other than a spirit
of moderation and a sense of responsibility—and civility—
on the part of those who exercise the guaranteed freedoms
of expression.149
The portion of the opinion that only represented a plurality of the
Court sounded similar themes.  The legislative history indicated “a de-
sire to maintain for licensees . . . a traditional journalistic role.”150  By
enacting the statutory provision prohibiting the government “from in-
terfering with the exercise of free speech over the broadcasting fre-
quencies[,] Congress pointedly refrained from divesting broadcasters
145 Id. at 111.
146 Id. at 104 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 7357 Before the H. Comm. on the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1924)).
147 Id. at 105.
148 Id. at 124.
149 Id. at 124–25.
150 Id. at 116 (plurality opinion).
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of their control over the selection of voices.”151  These statutory provi-
sions “clearly manifest the intention of Congress to maintain a sub-
stantial measure of journalistic independence for the broadcast
licensee.”152  The plurality concluded:
[I]t would be anomalous for us to hold, in the name of pro-
moting the constitutional guarantees of free expression, that
the day-to-day editorial decisions of broadcast licensees are
subject to the kind of restraints urged by respondents.  To do
so in the name of the First Amendment would be a contra-
diction.  Journalistic discretion would in many ways be lost to
the rigid limitations that the First Amendment imposes on
Government.153
Justice Stewart concurred, pointing out that forcing broadcasters
to develop a “nondiscriminatory system for controlling access . . . is
precisely what Congress intended to avoid through § 3(h) of the
Act.”154
The Court reemphasized the importance of broadcasters’ edito-
rial discretion in League of Women Voters, in which it overturned a
statute forbidding noncommercial educational television stations re-
ceiving grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting from
“engag[ing] in editorializing.”155  In so holding, the Court rejected ar-
guments that the interest in ensuring balanced coverage of public is-
sues justified overriding broadcasters’ editorial discretion.156  The
Court reasoned that “broadcasters are engaged in a vital and indepen-
dent form of communicative activity. . . .  Unlike common carriers,
broadcasters are ‘entitled under the First Amendment to exercise the
widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public [duties].’”157
The Court further concluded: “Indeed, if the public’s interest in re-
ceiving a balanced presentation of views is to be fully served, we must
necessarily rely in large part upon the editorial initiative and judgment
of the broadcasters . . . .”158  The Court later emphasized that “the
press, of which the broadcasting industry is indisputably a part, carries
out a historic, dual responsibility in our society of reporting informa-
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 120–21.
154 Id. at 140 n.9 (Stewart, J., concurring).
155 Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 730.
156 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378–80 (1984).
157 Id. at 378 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981)).
158 Id.
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tion and of bringing critical judgment to bear on public affairs.”159
Prohibiting public television stations from editorializing represented a
“substantial abridgment of important journalistic freedoms which the
First Amendment jealously protects.”160
The Court similarly noted in Turner I that “our cases have recog-
nized that Government regulation over the content of broadcast pro-
gramming must be narrow, and that broadcast licensees must retain
abundant discretion over programming choices.”161
The Court echoed the same concerns in Forbes, when it upheld
the decision by a state-owned public television station to exclude a
marginal third-party candidate for Congress from a televised de-
bate.162  The key premise underlying the Court’s analysis was that,
“[w]hen a public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selec-
tion and presentation of its programming, it engages in speech activ-
ity.”163  The importance of preserving this discretion justified
upholding the broadcaster’s decision to exclude the third-party candi-
date from the debate: “In the case of television broadcasting . . . broad
rights of access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a general
rule, to the discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exer-
cise to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.”164
The Court elaborated:
Congress has rejected the argument that “broadcast facilities
should be open on a nonselective basis to all persons wishing
to talk about public issues.”  Instead television broadcasters
enjoy the “widest journalistic freedom” consistent with their
public responsibilities. . . .  Public and private broadcasters
alike are not only permitted, but indeed required, to exercise
substantial editorial discretion in the selection and presenta-
tion of their programming.165
The fact that broadcasters often simply serve as the conduit for
the speech of others did not affect the analysis.  The Court noted, “Al-
though programming decisions often involve the compilation of the
speech of third parties, the decisions nonetheless constitute communi-
cative acts.”166
159 Id. at 382 (citation omitted).
160 Id. at 402.
161 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 651 (1994).
162 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998).
163 Id. at 674.
164 Id. at 673.
165 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 105, 110 (1973)).
166 Id. at 674.
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The possibility that broadcasters might discriminate among differ-
ent speakers did not justify regulatory intervention for the simple rea-
son that “a broadcaster by its nature will facilitate the expression of
some viewpoints instead of others.”167  The Court elaborated, invok-
ing the authority of CBS v. DNC, that “broadcasters must often
choose among speakers expressing different viewpoints.  ‘That edi-
tors—newspaper or broadcast—can and do abuse this power is be-
yond doubt,’ but ‘[c]alculated risks of abuse are taken in order to
preserve higher values.’”168  Any involvement of the government in
defining criteria for access “would risk implicating the courts in judg-
ments that should be left to the exercise of journalistic discretion.”169
2. Red Lion: Scarcity as a Justification for Limiting
Editorial Discretion
The Supreme Court’s broadcast precedents recognize the impor-
tant free speech values served by broadcasters’ exercise of editorial
discretion.  These values are served even when broadcasters exercise
their editorial discretion to favor a particular point of view or when
they are simply serving as conduits for others’ speech.  If the Court
had stopped here, any restrictions to broadcasters’ abilities to serve as
intermediaries would harm the free speech principles recognized by
the Court and thus would have to be sharply restricted, if not prohib-
ited altogether.
Despite the Court’s strong endorsement of preserving broadcast-
ers’ editorial discretion, it has long upheld laws requiring that broad-
casters serve as the conduit for the speech of others that presumably
would have been invalidated had they been imposed on newspa-
pers.170  The Court usually justified these decisions by invoking the so-
called scarcity doctrine first articulated by the Court in NBC, Inc. v.
United States.171  In most cases, speech is not a zero-sum game in
which one person’s speech crowds out another’s.  When that is the
167 Id.
168 Id. at 673–74 (quoting CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 124, 125).
169 Id. at 674.
170 See Red Lion Broad., Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC rules imposing
right-of-reply requirements on broadcasters that were remarkably similar to the rules later
struck down in Tornillo); see also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding a statute
requiring that broadcasters sell time to candidates for federal office).  Indeed, the Court has
noted that “of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited
First Amendment protection.”  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); accord Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (“It is true that our cases have
permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast speakers than of speakers in other media.”).
171 NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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case, people confronted with speech with which they disagree remain
free to offer their own point of view.  In short, the classic solution to
bad speech is more speech.172
With respect to broadcasting, however, the Court found that “cer-
tain basic facts about radio as a means of communication” rendered
this response insufficient.173  As the Court noted, radio’s “facilities are
limited; they are not available to all who may wish to use them; the
radio spectrum simply is not large enough to accommodate every-
body.  There is a fixed natural limitation upon the number of stations
that can operate without interfering with one another.”174  It is thus
inevitable that some will be able to broadcast while others will not,
and the decision to permit any person to broadcast necessarily pre-
vents others from doing so.
A series of lower court decisions foreclosing the Secretary of
Commerce from assigning broadcasters to particular frequencies pro-
vided the Court with what it viewed as a natural experiment in unreg-
ulated use of the spectrum.  “The result was confusion and chaos.
With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard.”175  This led the
Court to conclude that some form of government regulation of broad-
casting must be tolerated if the spectrum was not to be wasted as a
resource.176  The Court reiterated these points when discussing the ap-
plication of the First Amendment to broadcasting: “Unlike other
modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all.  That is its
unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expres-
sion, it is subject to governmental regulation.”177
The scarcity doctrine thus turned speech into a zero-sum game in
which bad speech could not always be met with more speech and in
which permitting one person to speak inevitably restricted another
person’s ability to do so.  Framing speech in this manner left the Court
on the horns of a dilemma.  Sustaining governmental allocation of
broadcast licenses inescapably meant sanctioning a restriction on
some people’s ability to engage in broadcast speech.  The alternative
meant that no one would be able to speak in this manner at all.  Con-
fronted with a choice between a world in which no one could speak
172 For the classic statement of this principle, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377
(1927) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies . . . the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”).
173 NBC, 319 U.S. at 213.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 212.
176 Id. at 213, 216.
177 Id. at 226.
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and one in which only some could speak, the Court concluded that the
First Amendment supported choosing the latter.  In short, permitting
some speakers to take advantage of this new technology would better
promote free speech values than would denying everyone the oppor-
tunity to do so.
The Court thus concluded that the First Amendment is not vio-
lated by the mere requirement that every broadcaster have a license
before speaking.178  This in turn raised the questions of how those li-
censes would be allocated and how the government should choose
among those who wish to broadcast.  The Court rejected the argument
that the government was limited to the role of “traffic officer,” inter-
ested only in overseeing the engineering and technical aspects of radio
communication and making sure that stations did not interfere with
one another.179  Instead, the Court concluded that the Radio Act of
1927 places on the government the “burden of determining the com-
position of that traffic.”180  The fact that “[t]he facilities of radio are
not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them” meant
that “[m]ethods must be devised for choosing from among the many
who apply.”181  The government should do so based on which appli-
cant would “‘render the best practicable service to the community
reached by his broadcasts.’”182
The rules at issue in NBC addressed the structure of the broad-
casting industry (specifically the terms under which individual stations
affiliated with broadcast networks).  As such, the case did not provide
an opportunity for the Court to address how the “burden of determin-
ing the composition of that traffic” would determine which applicant
would provide the best possible service.  The Federal Radio Commis-
sion (“FRC”) and its successor, the FCC, based their licensing deci-
sions in large part on the content being transmitted.183  The Supreme
Court gave this level of regulation its implicit imprimatur in Red Lion
Broadcasting, Co. v. FCC,184 which upheld the constitutionality of
FCC decisions and rules requiring broadcasters to give a free right of
reply any time a broadcaster politically endorsed a candidate for of-
178 Id. at 227.
179 Id. at 215, 217.
180 Id. at 216.
181 Id.
182 Id. (quoting FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)).
183 Yoo, supra note 17, at 260–66.
184 Red Lion Broad., Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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fice or transmitted a personal attack on a person’s honesty, character,
or integrity.185
The Red Lion Court recounted the history previously discussed in
NBC186 and drew the similar conclusion that with broadcasting, “only
a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence can hope to
communicate by radio at the same time if intelligible communication
is to be had.”187  As a result, “because the frequencies reserved for
public broadcasting were limited in number, it was essential for the
Government to tell some applicants that they could not broadcast at
all because there was room for only a few.”188  In other words, “only a
few can be licensed and the rest must be barred from the airwaves.”189
Requiring all broadcasters to have a license before speaking thus did
not violate the First Amendment.  Any other conclusion would dis-
serve free speech values by preventing anyone from engaging in
broadcast speech.  The Court observed: “It would be strange if the
First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communica-
tions, prevented the Government from making radio communication
possible . . . by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd
the spectrum.”190
But the Court did not stop there, noting that “by the same token,
as far as the First Amendment is concerned[,] those who are licensed
stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused.”191  As a re-
sult, the fact that the First Amendment permits the government to
deny one person a license and give it to another person implied that
the First Amendment also permitted the government to require the
person granted the license to share his frequency with those denied
licenses.  Additionally, this interpretation allowed the government to
mandate that a licensee “conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with
obligations to present those views and voices which are representative
of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred
from the airwaves.”192  In other words, “[b]ecause of the scarcity of
185 Id. at 373.
186 Id. at 375–77, 388.
187 Id. at 388.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 389.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.; accord id. at 390–91 (“Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively
small number of licensees . . . the Government could surely have decreed that each frequency
should be shared among all or some of those who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of
the broadcast day or the broadcast week. . . .  As we have said, the First Amendment confers no
right on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on ‘their’ frequencies and no right to an
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radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on
licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this
unique medium.”193
Thus, scarcity inverts the usual priority of First Amendment val-
ues.  When there is no physical limit on the number of people who can
speak, as is the case with newspapers, it is the speakers’ interests that
are paramount even if those speakers have an economic monopoly,
and the cure for any private censorship that may exist is more speech,
not regulation.  The situation is different when the opportunities to
speak are scarce.  The Court noted, “There is no sanctuary in the First
Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium
not open to all.”194  When that is the case, “[i]t is the right of the view-
ers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount.”195
Interestingly, even the less protective standard announced by Red
Lion did not mean that the free speech interests of would-be speakers
necessarily prevailed over the free speech interests of the in-
termediaries.  On the contrary, cases applying the scarcity doctrine,
such as CBS v. DNC, emphasized that the tradeoff between the pub-
lic’s interest in balanced content and preserving the broadcasters’ role
as a “journalistic ‘free agent’” necessitated a “delicate balancing of
competing interests” and required regulators to “walk a ‘tightrope’”
between the competing free speech values.196
As a result, the Court’s broadcasting cases consistently treated
both of these considerations as important values that must be traded
off against one another.197  Although the Court’s articulation of the
unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the right
to use.”).
193 Id. at 390.
194 Id. at 392.
195 Id. at 390; accord id. at 394 (“Congress need not stand idly by and permit those with
licenses to ignore the problems which beset the people or to exclude from the airways anything
but their own views of fundamental questions.”).
196 CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973); see also id. at 104 (noting that broadcaster regula-
tion posed the “major dilemma” of “how to strike a proper balance between private and public
control”).
197 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984) (recognizing
that the “freedom to advocate one’s own positions without also presenting opposing viewpoints”
must be balanced against the governmental interest in “ensuring adequate and balanced cover-
age of public issues”); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (recognizing that broadcast
regulation implicates “[t]he First Amendment interests of candidates and voters, as well as
broadcasters” and that the Court “has never approved a general right of access to the media” and
would at most uphold “a limited right to ‘reasonable’ access” (first emphasis added)).
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appropriate constitutional standard has been less than clear,198 all of
the potential standards implicitly recognize that the editorial discre-
tion exercised by intermediaries remained an important consideration
in the free speech balance.  It also bears noting that the consideration
on the other side of the balance is not that of the would-be speaker
who wishes to use the broadcast station as a platform conveying its
speech, but rather that of the listener.  Even this more limited First
Amendment standard does not support the type of unfettered access
to the conduit of the type sought by nonintermediation proponents.
Interestingly, Red Lion considered the possibility that improve-
ments in the ability to use the spectrum more efficiently might elimi-
nate scarcity.199  Although the Court ultimately concluded that
demands for frequencies had outstripped the pace of technological im-
provement so that the spectrum continued to be scarce,200 the fact that
it entertained the possibility seemed to suggest that this justification
for deviating from the print paradigm, which prohibited any infringe-
ment on newspaper’s editorial discretion, might collapse should scar-
city ever cease to be a constraint on broadcast speech.  Similarly, the
CBS v. DNC Court seemed to suggest that the principles governing
broadcast regulation might change when it observed that “the broad-
cast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change” and that
“solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and
those acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years hence.”201  Jus-
tice Douglas’s concurrence in the judgment similarly noted that
“[s]carcity may soon be a constraint of the past, thus obviating the
concerns expressed in Red Lion.  It has been predicted that it may be
possible within 10 years to provide television viewers 400 channels
through the advances of cable television.”202
The Court made this point most explicitly in League of Women
Voters.  The Court began by recognizing that regulations designed to
198 The Court has clearly indicated that the standard is less than strict scrutiny, but it has
struggled to determine precisely what standard should apply.  For example, League of Women
Voters employed language reminiscent of intermediate scrutiny when it held that restrictions on
broadcasters’ editorial discretion must be “narrowly tailored to further a substantial government
interest.” League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380.  In another case, the Court used language
more reminiscent of the rational basis standard. See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad.,
436 U.S. 775, 802, 803 (1978) (upholding regulations as a “reasonable means of promoting the
public interest” and as “a rational weighing of competing policies”); id. at 805, 808 n.29, 814, 815
(concluding that the FCC did not act irrationally).
199 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396–400.
200 Id. at 400–01.
201 CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 102 (plurality opinion).
202 Id. at 158 n.8 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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ensure that “the public receives . . . a balanced presentation of infor-
mation on issues of public importance” “[have] never been allowed
with respect to the print media.”203  At the same time, “‘differences in
the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them.’”204  With respect to broad-
casting, the scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum justified requir-
ing broadcasters who receive licenses to “serve in a sense as
fiduciaries for the public by presenting ‘those views and voices which
are representative of [their] community and which would otherwise,
by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.’”205
In other words, it was the limitation of opportunities to speak
that justified placing restrictions on broadcasters’ exercise of their
own editorial discretion.  Subsequent language in the Court’s opinion
essentially confirmed this interpretation when it recognized that it was
the fact that “the broadcasting industry plainly operates under re-
straints not imposed upon other media” that justified denying broad-
casters “the absolute freedom to advocate one’s own positions without
also presenting opposing viewpoints” enjoyed by newspapers.206  The
structure of this argument implied that broadcasters’ editorial discre-
tion would once again enjoy the same protection as newspapers’
should scarcity ever cease to be an issue.
Indeed, the Court seemed to entertain just that possibility when it
noted:
The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on
spectrum scarcity has come under increasing criticism in re-
cent years.  Critics, including the incumbent Chairman of the
FCC, charge that with the advent of cable and satellite televi-
sion technology, communities now have access to such a
wide variety of stations that the scarcity doctrine is
obsolete.207
However, the Court was “not prepared . . . to reconsider [its]
longstanding approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC
that technological developments have advanced so far that some revi-
sion of the system of broadcast regulation may be required.”208  Ac-
203 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377 (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
204 Id. (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386).
205 Id. (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389).
206 Id. at 380.
207 Id. at 376 n.11 (citing Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221–26 (1982)).
208 Id. at 377 n.11.  The FCC arguably provided just such a signal when it repealed the
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cording to this reasoning, should technology ever reach the point
where the broadcast spectrum ceased to be scarce, the print paradigm
would once again apply.  This reasoning also implied that restrictions
on editorial discretion would not apply to any future technologies to
the extent that they are not scarce.
I have reviewed the scarcity doctrine’s analytical deficiencies at
length elsewhere and need not repeat that critique here.209  Whatever
the scarcity doctrine’s continuing validity with respect to broadcast-
ing,210 the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Reno v. ACLU
firmly shut the door on extending the scarcity doctrine to the In-
ternet.211  The Court reasoned that because the Internet “provides rel-
atively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds,” it
“can hardly be considered a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity.”212  As a
result, the Court flatly concluded that “our cases provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be ap-
plied to this medium.”213
Following such a sweeping declaration of the inapplicability of
the scarcity doctrine to the Internet, it is hard to see how it could serve
as a justification for overriding Internet intermediaries’ exercises of
Fairness Doctrine in 1987. See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station
WTVH Syracuse, New York, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), aff’d,
867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  Despite this fact, the Court nonetheless reaffirmed the scarcity
doctrine when it next had the chance to review it, see Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
566–67 (1990), an outcome best explained by the manner in which the Court’s broadcast juris-
prudence became tied up in the judicial politics surrounding affirmative action, see Yoo, supra
note 17, at 286–88.
209 See Yoo, supra note 17, at 267–69.
210 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1820–22 (2009) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (calling for the scarcity doctrine to be overruled); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner
I), 512 U.S. 622, 638 (1994) (noting the critique of the scarcity doctrine with respect to
broadcasting).
211 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
212 Id.
213 Id.  Some scholars have attempted to reconstruct this rationale, shifting the focus from
the scarcity of spectrum to the scarcity of attention.  Drawing on Herbert Simon’s insight that “a
wealth of information creates a poverty of attention,” Herbert Simon, Designing Organizations
for an Information-Rich World, Speech at the Johns Hopkins University and Brookings Institu-
tion Symposium, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40 (Martin
Greenberger ed., 1971), these scholars argue that information overload becomes a justification
for limiting search engines’ abilities to intermediate speech, see Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7,
at 1158; Chandler, supra note 7, at 1104; Elkin-Koren, supra note 7, at 183–84.  This argument is
curious for a number of reasons.  As an initial matter, in attempting to recast abundance as
scarcity, it turns scarcity on its head.  Moreover, a world of abundance increases, not decreases,
the need for strong exercises of editorial discretion.  Lastly, since attention is inherently limited,
if accepted, such a rationale would admit of no limiting principle and would lead to endemic
regulation of every aspect of an individual’s online interactions.
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editorial discretion.  In the absence of such a scarcity justification, the
default is the newspaper standard, in which the intermediaries’ edito-
rial discretion predominates.
3. Pacifica: Invasiveness and Accessibility as a Justification for
Limiting Editorial Discretion
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,214 the Court once again reaffirmed
that the print paradigm represented the relevant baseline when it reit-
erated that “the First Amendment protects newspaper publishers
from being required to print the replies of those whom they criti-
cize.”215  Broadcasting, however, enjoyed no such protection.216
Rather than invoking the scarcity doctrine, the Court proceeded to
articulate two new rationales for extending a lesser degree of First
Amendment protection to broadcasting: “First, the broadcast media
have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans” with the ability to “confront[ ] the citizen . . . in the pri-
vacy of the home.”217  “Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children, even those too young to read.”218  It bears mentioning that,
like the scarcity cases, Pacifica regards newspapers as a baseline.219
Presumably, if Pacifica’s rationales fail, the primacy of editorial discre-
tion associated with newspapers will govern.
I have described the analytical shortcomings of these rationales
elsewhere.220  Indeed, there are some indications that the Court may
be ready to overturn Pacifica.221  Regardless of its eventual survival
with respect to broadcasting, the Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU
squarely foreclosed any possibility that Pacifica’s rationales might be
extended to the Internet.  As the Court noted, “the Internet is not as
‘invasive’ as radio or television.  The District Court specifically found
that ‘[c]ommunications over the Internet do not invade an individual’s
home or appear on one’s computer screen unbidden.  Users seldom
214 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
215 Id. at 748 (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
216 Id. (citing Red Lion Broad., Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377–78 (1969)).
217 Id. (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736–37 (1970)).
218 Id. at 749.
219 See id. at 748.
220 Yoo, supra note 17, at 292–303.
221 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009) (remanding to the court
of appeals a challenge to the FCC’s decision to abandon its “fleeting expletives” policy, while
noting that the constitutionality of the indecency restrictions of the type upheld by Pacifica “will
be determined soon enough, perhaps in this very case”); id. at 1819–22 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(calling for Pacifica to be overruled).
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encounter content by accident.’”222  The Court further noted that it
had rejected a similar argument in Sable Communications of Califor-
nia, Inc. v. FCC,223 in which the government had invoked Pacifica to
justify a statutory prohibition of indecent dial-a-porn messages.224  The
Reno Court observed that Sable had distinguished Pacifica’s “‘em-
pathically narrow holding’” by noting that “‘the dial-it medium re-
quires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the
communication’” and pointing out that objectionable content is gen-
erally preceded by warnings, which made it less likely that the recipi-
ent would be taken by surprise.225
The Court further concluded that, absent the applicability of the
Pacifica rationales, any restrictions must be narrowly tailored to the
harm if they are to survive constitutional scrutiny.226  The existence of
software allowing parents have the ability to screen out unwanted
content vitiated any claim that the ban was narrowly tailored.227  In
such a world, concerns about invasiveness and accessibility seem sin-
gularly misplaced.
Following such a categorical rejection, it is hard to see how
Pacifica can serve as a basis for subjecting the Internet to a lower level
of First Amendment scrutiny. Pacifica’s reasoning suggests that the
Internet will be governed by the baseline level of First Amendment
protection associated with newspapers, under which the intermedi-
ary’s editorial discretion takes primacy.
The broadcast precedents thus fail to provide any basis for over-
riding the editorial discretion exercised by Internet intermediaries.
They do more than simply recognize that intermediaries’ exercises of
editorial discretion promote important free speech values that should
be protected.  Given that the Supreme Court has already held both
lines of precedent applying the more relaxed First Amendment stan-
dard to broadcasting inapplicable to the Internet, the broadcast prece-
dents imply that the exercises of editorial discretion by Internet
intermediaries should receive the same level of protection as that of
222 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844
(E.D. Pa. 1996)).
223 Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
224 Reno, 521 U.S. at 869 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 126).
225 Id. at 870 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 127–28).
226 See id. at 879, 882 (holding that the restrictions imposed by the Communications De-
cency Act of 1996 failed to pass constitutional muster because they were not narrowly tailored).
227 Id. at 877; accord Sable, 492 U.S. at 130–31 (noting that because the technological re-
strictions on dial-a-porn messages were adequate to prevent most young children from hearing
them, an outright ban on obscene phone messages was not narrowly tailored).
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newspapers.  Consistent with this interpretation, subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have evaluated restrictions on Internet speech on the
presumption that the Internet is entitled to full First Amendment pro-
tection.228  The Supreme Court’s broadcast precedents are thus best
read as providing a strong endorsement of the importance of preserv-
ing intermediaries’ editorial discretion.  Any restriction of that discre-
tion would inhibit important free speech values.
C. The Importance of and Limits on Editorial Discretion Exercised
by Cable Operators
The importance of preserving intermediaries’ editorial discretion
draws further support from the Supreme Court’s decisions with re-
spect to the other major medium of electronic communications: cable
television.  As was the case with the Court’s newspaper and broadcast
precedents, these decisions affirm and reaffirm that cable operators’
decisions about what speech to carry represent an important exercise
of free speech.  This editorial discretion furthers important free speech
values even if the cable operator is simply serving as a conduit for the
speech of others or uses its discretion to favor a particular perspective.
Indeed, the ability to favor particular points of view is the very es-
sence of editorial discretion, and that ability cannot be regulated with-
out inhibiting the free speech benefits that such exercises of editorial
discretion provide.229
Turner I did hold that some restriction of a cable operator’s edito-
rial discretion might be justified if it exercised exclusive control over a
critical physical bottleneck.230  Judicial recognition of multiple options
for receiving Internet service, however, renders it highly unlikely that
this rationale would justify upholding similar restrictions on the
Internet.
1. The Importance of Cable Operators’ Editorial Discretion
The Supreme Court’s decisions with respect to cable television
have long emphasized the importance of preserving cable operators’
editorial discretion.  The Court first addressed the issue in FCC v.
228 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (concluding that a regulation on In-
ternet speech could stand only if it constitutes “the least restrictive means available”); Ashcroft
v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 580 (2002) (holding that Internet speech regulations must be “suffi-
ciently narrowed” to survive First Amendment scrutiny).
229 For a contrary argument, see Mark S. Nadel, Editorial Freedom: Editors, Retailers, and
Access to the Mass Media, 9 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 213 (1987).
230 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 656–57 (1994).
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Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II),231 in which the Court re-
jected the FCC’s attempt to impose what amounted to a common-
carriage requirement on cable operators.232  The Court’s primary basis
for overturning the regulation was statutory.  The absence of a statute
explicitly giving the FCC jurisdiction over cable television meant that
any regulatory authority that it possessed necessarily derived from
cable’s ancillary impact on broadcasting.  Given that the FCC’s juris-
diction over cable was completely derivative of its jurisdiction over
broadcasting, any statutory limitations placed on its power to regulate
broadcasting necessarily applied to its power to regulate cable as
well.233
For purposes of the regulations at issue in Midwest Video II, the
most important limitation on the FCC’s jurisdiction over broadcasting
was the statutory provision preventing it from treating broadcasters as
common carriers, as indicated by the legislative history reviewed in
CBS v. DNC.234  Thus, in assessing the legality of the FCC’s attempt to
impose common carriage obligations on cable operators, the Court
could not “ignore Congress’ stern disapproval . . . of negation of the
editorial discretion otherwise enjoyed by broadcasters and cable oper-
ators alike.”235  The fact that “Congress has restricted the Commis-
sion’s ability to advance objectives associated with public access at the
expense of the journalistic freedom of persons engaged in broadcast-
ing” dictated that the FCC also lacked the authority to impose similar
restrictions on the journalistic freedom of persons engaged in provid-
ing cable television service.236
The Court also invoked policy considerations, finding that the
free speech considerations that justified protecting the editorial dis-
cretion of broadcasters also applied to cable operators.  The Court
concluded that Congress’s refusal to restrict journalistic freedom by
treating them as common carriers is not a limitation “having peculiar
applicability to television broadcasting.  Its force is not diminished by
the variant technology involved in cable transmissions.  Cable opera-
tors now share with broadcasters a significant amount of editorial dis-
cretion regarding what their programming will include.”237  In so
ruling, the Court rejected claims that the restriction on cable opera-
231 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
232 Id. at 708–09.
233 Id. at 706–08.
234 Id. at 702–04 (citing CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 105–09 (1973)).
235 Id. at 708.
236 Id. at 707.
237 Id.
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tors’ editorial discretion was not significant, although the Court re-
served the question of whether “the discretion exercised by cable
operators is of the same magnitude as that enjoyed by broadcast-
ers.”238  Even if the restriction did not displace alternative program-
ming, “compelling cable operators indiscriminately to accept access
programming [would] interfere with their determinations regarding
the total service offering to be extended to subscribers.”239  Because
the Court was able to resolve the case on statutory grounds, it did not
address the conclusion reached by the court below that the common-
carriage restriction violated the First Amendment, “save to acknowl-
edge that [the question] is not frivolous.”240
The Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commu-
nications, Inc.241 further acknowledged the importance of the editorial
discretion exercised by cable operators.  In that case, a cable operator
argued that a city’s refusal to grant it a cable television franchise vio-
lated its free speech rights.242  The district court had dismissed the
cable operator’s First Amendment challenge for failure to state a
claim, only to see that decision overturned by the Supreme Court.243
The Court unequivocally held that “the activities in which [the cable
operator] allegedly seeks to engage plainly implicate First Amend-
ment interests.”244  In so holding, the Court quoted with approval the
cable operator’s assertion that
[t]he business of cable television, like that of newspapers and
magazines, is to provide its subscribers with a mixture of
news, information and entertainment.  As do newspapers,
cable television companies use a portion of their available
space to reprint (or retransmit) the communications of
others, while at the same time providing some original
content.245
Thus, the Court concluded that “through original programming
or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs
to include in its repertoire, [a cable operator] seeks to communicate
messages on a wide variety of topics and a wide variety of formats.”246
238 Id. at 707 n.17.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 709 n.19.
241 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
242 Id. at 491–92.
243 Id. at 492.
244 Id. at 494.
245 Id.
246 Id.
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The Court also reaffirmed its recognition in Midwest Video II that
“cable operators exercise ‘a significant amount of editorial discretion
regarding what their programming will include.’”247  The Court
elaborated:
Cable television partakes of some the aspects of speech and
the communication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises
of newspaper and book publishers, public speakers, and
pamphleteers.  Respondent’s proposed activities would seem
to implicate First Amendment interests as do the activities of
wireless broadcasters, which were found to fall with the am-
bit of the First Amendment . . . .248
Preferred Communications thus clearly established that speech by
cable operators implicates the First Amendment.  Moreover, the
Court’s acknowledgement that cable operators promote free speech
not only when they produce original programming, but also when they
“use a portion of their available space to reprint (or retransmit) the
communications of others,” confirms that they serve free speech val-
ues even when they are simply serving as the conduit for others’
speech.249
The Court reaffirmed that cable operators’ exercises of editorial
discretion promote important free speech values in Leathers v.
Medlock.250  There, the Court stated that “[c]able television provides
to its subscribers news, information, and entertainment.  It is engaged
in ‘speech’ under the First Amendment, and is, in much of its opera-
tion, part of the ‘press.’”251
The Court also endorsed this conclusion in Turner I.252  In that
case, the Court sweepingly proclaimed that “[t]here can be no disa-
greement” on the “initial premise” that “[c]able programmers and
cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled
to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First
Amendment.”253  Indeed, that is the case regardless of whether the
cable operator is offering “original programming” or simply “‘exercis-
ing editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in
its repertoire.’”254  In so holding, the Court concluded that “the ratio-
247 Id. (quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979)).
248 Id. at 494–95.
249 Id. at 494.
250 Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991).
251 Id.
252 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994).
253 Id. (citing Leathers, 499 U.S. at 444).
254 Id. (quoting Preferred Commc’ns, 476 U.S. at 494).
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nale for applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment scru-
tiny to broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the case
elaborating it, does not apply in the context of cable regulation.”255
After noting the judicial and academic criticism of the scarcity
doctrine,256 the Court found that the fact that “cable television does
not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the broad-
cast medium” and the lack of “any danger of physical interference
between two cable speakers attempting to share the same channel”
rendered the scarcity rationale inapposite.257  As a result, the Court
found that “application of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny
adopted in Red Lion and the other broadcast cases is inapt when de-
termining the First Amendment validity of cable regulation.”258
The Court returned to the issue of the free speech values pro-
moted by cable operators’ editorial discretion in Denver Area Educa-
tional Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC.259  Although the
decision yielded a large number of badly fractured opinions, the Court
unanimously reaffirmed the positive role that cable operators’ edito-
rial discretion plays in promoting free speech.
For example, the plurality opinion authored by Justice Breyer, in
which Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter joined in relevant part,
began by noting that cable channels play a variety of roles, including
serving as the conduit for the speech of others, providing original pro-
gramming, and retransmitting over-the-air broadcast signals.260  The
plurality reiterated the Court’s recognition in Turner I that “the edito-
rial function itself is an aspect of ‘speech,’ and a court’s decision that a
private party, say, the station owner, is a ‘censor,’ could itself interfere
with that private ‘censor’s’ freedom to speak as an editor.”261  Any
attempt to focus solely on the interests of those who would use cable
as a conduit for their speech ignores the “legitimate role” played by
“the expressive interests of cable operators.”262
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Ginsburg, raised similar
themes, noting that “[c]able operators have First Amendment rights,
of course,” and that “a cable operator’s activities in originating pro-
grams or exercising editorial discretion over programs others provide
255 Id. at 637.
256 Id. at 638.
257 Id. at 639.
258 Id.
259 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
260 Id. at 733–34 (plurality opinion).
261 Id. at 737–38 (citing Turner I, 512 U.S. at 636).
262 Id. at 747.
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on its system . . . are protected.”263  Justice Kennedy distinguished be-
tween leased access, which regulates channels over which cable opera-
tors have historically exercised discretion, and public access, which
regulates channels over which cable operators had never exercised
control, concluding that laws that regulate the former are more prob-
lematic than laws that regulate the latter.264  In drawing this distinc-
tion, Justice Kennedy reinforced the important role that editorial
discretion plays in promoting free speech in those areas in which edi-
torial discretion exists.
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, took an even more expansive view of cable operators’ First
Amendment Rights.  As Justice Thomas noted, the Supreme Court’s
precedents have long recognized that cable operators engage in
speech both when they originate programming and when they exercise
editorial discretion over which stations to include.265  Although con-
siderable ambiguity existed as to whether cable operators’ editorial
discretion would be “entitled to the substantial First Amendment pro-
tections afforded the print media” or would be subject to the lesser
protections extended to broadcasting, the Court clarified that “[o]ver
time, . . . [it has] drawn closer to recognizing that cable operators
should enjoy the same First Amendment rights as the nonbroadcast
media.”266  Indeed, despite the disagreement in Turner I over whether
the must-carry rules were content-based, Justice Thomas found that
“there was agreement that cable operators are generally entitled to
much the same First Amendment protection as the print media.”267
Justice Thomas further reasoned that embracing the print para-
digm meant extending the highest level of First Amendment protec-
tion to cable operators’ exercises of editorial discretion.  After Turner
I, the Red Lion Court’s statement that the interests of viewers and
listeners are paramount “can no longer be given any credence in the
cable context.  It is the operator’s right that is preeminent.”268  Under
the print standard, “when there is a conflict, a programmer’s asserted
263 Id. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
264 Id. at 793, 796.
265 Id. at 814–15 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(citing City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986); Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991)).
266 Id. at 813–14.
267 Id. at 815; accord id. at 816 (noting that Turner I “adopt[ed] much of the print para-
digm” and “reject[ed] Red Lion” for cable).
268 Id. at 816.
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right to transmit over an operator’s cable system must give way to the
operator’s editorial discretion.”269  Indeed, Turner I implicated the
First Amendment because must-carry rules “interfered with the oper-
ators’ editorial discretion by forcing them to carry broadcast program-
ming that they might not otherwise carry.”270  The Court “implicitly
recognized in [Turner I] that the programmer’s right to compete for
channel space is derivative of, and subordinate to, the operator’s edi-
torial discretion” and that programmers “ha[ve] no freestanding First
Amendment right to have [their] programming transmitted.”271  In
reaching this conclusion, the Court in Turner I “recogniz[ed] the gen-
eral primacy of the cable operator’s editorial rights over the rights of
programmers and viewers.”272  Thus, “it is the cable operator, not the
access programmer, whose speech rights have been infringed.”273  As a
result, Justice Thomas embraced a “constitutional presumption . . .
run[ning] in favor of the operators’ editorial discretion” and rejected a
constitutional presumption in favor of any right of programmers to
speak on access channels.274
The different positions adopted by the various opinions in Denver
are not susceptible to easy synthesis.  Although the Justices disagreed
on the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to and the constitu-
tionality of various provisions, the Court was unanimous in concluding
that the editorial discretion exercised by cable operators promotes im-
portant free speech values.  These values are implicated even if cable
operators are simply serving as the conduit for the speech of others.
The fact that cable operators may favor certain speech over others is
not a potential problem to be remediated.  On the contrary, such fa-
voritism is inherent in any exercise of editorial discretion.  Thus, any
regulatory limits placed on cable operators’ editorial discretion would
prevent these important free speech values from being realized.
2. Turner I: Gatekeeper Control as a Justification for Limiting
Editorial Discretion
The Supreme Court’s cable cases thus recognized that cable oper-
ators’ exercises of editorial discretion promote important free speech
values.  In addition, Turner I squarely foreclosed any possibility that
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 816–17.
272 Id. at 817.
273 Id. at 824.
274 Id. at 822.
746 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 78:697
the scarcity doctrine used to justify restrictions on broadcasters’ edito-
rial discretion would be applied to cable.275
At the same time, Turner I offered three reasons for declining to
apply the print standard articulated in Tornillo to cable.  The first two
reasons were general principles that would apply to all forms of
speech and thus could not serve to distinguish communications trans-
mitted via cable television from other forms of communication.276  The
third reason focused on “an important technological difference be-
tween newspapers and cable television.”277  Specifically, the Court
noted that, “[a]lthough a daily newspaper and a cable operator both
may enjoy monopoly status in a given locale, the cable operator exer-
cises far greater control over access to the relevant medium.”278  Even
if a newspaper is a natural monopoly, it “does not possess the power
to obstruct readers’ access to other competing publications” and can-
not “prevent other newspapers from being distributed to willing recip-
ients in the same locale.”279
The Court concluded, however, that “[t]he same is not true with
cable.”280  Instead, “[w]hen an individual subscribes to cable, the phys-
ical connection between the television set and the cable network gives
the cable operator bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if not
all) of the television programming that is channeled into the sub-
scriber’s home.”281  Cable operators’ “ownership of the essential path-
way for cable speech” thus gives them the power to “silence the voice
of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.”282  This “physi-
cal control of a critical pathway of communication” creates a “poten-
tial for abuse of . . . private power over a central avenue of
communication” sufficient to justify a greater intrusion on cable oper-
ators’ editorial discretion than would be permitted with respect to
newspapers.283
275 See supra notes 255–58 and accompanying text.
276 The first reason was that the restrictions at issue “are not activated by any particular
message spoken by cable operators and thus exact no content-based penalty.”  Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994).  The second reason was that the Court did
not think that the regulation would “force cable operators to alter their own messages to re-
spond to the broadcast programming they are required to carry.” Id.
277 Id. at 656.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id. (emphasis added).
282 Id. at 656.
283 Id. at 657.
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Several aspects of the Court’s decision bear emphasizing.  First, it
is instructive that the Court took the print paradigm as the relevant
baseline.  This implies that, unless some justification for deviating
from that standard is shown, cable and other media should enjoy the
same First Amendment protection as newspapers.  Second, the Court
specifically rejected the argument that the fact that a particular tech-
nology may be an economic monopoly justified according it a lesser
degree of First Amendment protection.  Instead, it was only the cable
operators’ control of an exclusive physical connection that gave rise to
the concerns about private censorship sufficient to justify overriding
the cable operators’ exercises of editorial discretion.  Otherwise,
Tornillo would have been wrongly decided, and the government
would be able to impose access requirements on any player possessing
a dominant economic position without violating the First
Amendment.
Whatever the continuing validity of the bottleneck rationale with
respect to cable television,284 it almost certainly has no applicability to
the Internet.285  Over the past decade, cable and telephone companies
have engaged in spirited competition to deploy cable modem and Dig-
ital Subscriber Line (“DSL”) technologies.  Although cable modem
providers established and maintained an early lead on DSL, more re-
cently, telephone companies have begun deploying more advanced
technologies, such as Verizon’s fiber-based FiOS network and
AT&T’s VDSL-based U-verse network, that have made it possible for
them to deliver bandwidth speeds that surpass those permitted by the
current cable modem architecture.286  The resulting competition has in
turn forced the cable industry to upgrade its infrastructure by de-
ploying a new technology known as DOCSIS 3.0, which is capable of
supporting even higher speeds.287
But perhaps the most important and often overlooked change in
the competitive landscape over the past few years is the advent of
284 See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669,
722 (2005) (discussing how the functional similarity between cable and direct-broadcast satellite
(“DBS”) is undercutting the rationale for technology-based distinctions under the First Amend-
ment); Yoo, supra note 12, at 207–08, 228–29 (describing the growing competition between cable
and DBS).
285 See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1765
(1995) (“Turner is quite different from imaginable future cases involving new information tech-
nologies, including the Internet, which includes no bottleneck problem.”).
286 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access, 22
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7–9 (2008).
287 Vishesh Kumar, Cable Prepares an Answer to FiOS, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2008, at B3.
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mobile wireless.  Mobile wireless services have enjoyed spectacular
growth over the past few years.  Measured in terms of “advanced ser-
vice lines” (defined as service capable of supporting over 200 kbps in
both directions), mobile wireless has gone from having no subscribers
as of the beginning of 2005 to having over 14.5 million subscribers and
roughly 17% of the market by the end of 2008.288  The success of wire-
less broadband becomes even more dramatic if measured in terms of
“high speed lines” (defined as service capable of supporting over 200
kbps in at least one direction).  Over the same time period, mobile
wireless has now captured nearly 25 million subscribers, which repre-
sents over 24% of the market.289  At the same time, a consortium of
companies led by Sprint is preparing to deploy a new wireless network
based on the WiMax technology.290  The eventual deployment of ser-
vices based on spectrum allocated through the 700 MHz auction
promises to intensify competition still further.
The presence of such vibrant competition has led courts and regu-
lators repeatedly to reject arguments that the market for last-mile In-
ternet service is sufficiently concentrated to justify the imposition of a
mandatory access requirement.  For example, in Comcast Cablevision
of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County,291 the court held that the
emerging competition between DSL and cable modem providers ren-
dered the bottleneck rationale of Turner I inapposite to cable modem
service.292  Relying on an FCC report projecting that the broadband
industry did not appear to be a natural monopoly and would instead
be characterized by vibrant intermodal competition once consumers
had migrated from dial-up to broadband services, the court found that
the bottleneck rationale announced in Turner I did not justify subject-
ing the Internet to a lower standard of First Amendment scrutiny than
newspapers.293
288 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 2008, at 10 tbl.2 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily
_Business/2010/db0212/DOC-296239A1.pdf.
289 Id. at 9 tbl.1.
290 Saul Hansell, Sprint Banks on WiMax to Win Back Market Share, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2009, at B1.
291 Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685
(S.D. Fla. 2000).
292 Id. at 696.
293 Id. (citing Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capa-
bility to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report, 14
F.C.C.R. 2398, 2423 ¶ 48 (1999)).
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This conclusion is reinforced by subsequent judicial and regula-
tory decisions recognizing the competitiveness of the broadband mar-
ket.  For example, in United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,294 the D.C.
Circuit overturned an FCC decision ruling that the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”) required local telephone companies to
share the high-frequency portion of its loops with other DSL provid-
ers largely because of “the robust competition . . . in the broadband
market” between DSL, cable modems, wireless broadband, and other
technologies.295  The FCC’s 2005 Wireline Broadband Access Order
similarly ruled that because the market for last-mile broadband ser-
vice had already become quite competitive and was likely to become
more so in the years to come, DSL-related elements should be re-
moved from the list of network elements to which incumbent local
telephone companies must provide unbundled access under the 1996
Act.296  Most recently, the Supreme Court specifically invoked this
finding in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications,
Inc.,297 in which it noted that “the market for high-speed Internet ser-
vice is now quite competitive” and that “DSL providers face stiff com-
petition from cable companies and wireless and satellite providers.”298
These pronouncements make it difficult to see how any court
could invoke the bottleneck rationale articulated in Turner I to justify
greater intrusions into Internet providers’ editorial discretion than
would be permissible with respect to newspapers.299  In the absence of
such a justification, the print model dictates that Internet providers’
294 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
295 Id. at 428–29.
296 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,883–87 ¶¶ 55–64
(2005), petition for review denied sub nom. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d
Cir. 2007).
297 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009).
298 Id. at 1118 n.2.
299 Some commentators have argued that search engines have sufficient “‘control of a criti-
cal pathway of communication’” to justify bringing them within the ambit of the exception rec-
ognized by Turner I. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 1191 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994)); Chandler, supra note 7, at 1126–27 (same).
This contention ignores Turner I’s explicit rejection of the argument that a dominant market
share, by itself, justified upholding a restriction on cable operators’ editorial discretion.  Instead,
the Court’s decision turned on cable operators’ controls over exclusive physical connections.
Because search engines do not own any of the physical infrastructure connecting end users to the
Internet, unlike cable operators, they cannot block any end user from accessing any particular
content.  Indeed, any end user unhappy with the services provided by a particular search engine
can easily switch to another search engine with just a few keystrokes and clicks of a mouse.
750 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 78:697
editorial discretion represents a major, if not the dominant, considera-
tion in the free speech calculus.
3. Denver: The Failed Analogy to Pacifica and the History
of Regulation
The Supreme Court’s decision in Denver300 also experimented
with alternative rationales for subjecting cable operators to a lower
level of First Amendment scrutiny.  The badly fragmented opinions in
that case are not easily synthesized.  The primary controversy was
over the constitutionality of statutory provisions authorizing cable op-
erators to refuse to carry indecent programming on their leased access
and public access cable channels.301  The plurality concluded that “the
changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial
structure related to telecommunications” rendered “it unwise and un-
necessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words
now,”302 an aspect of the decision that drew sharp rebukes from the
other five members of the Court.303  Instead, the plurality cited a laun-
dry list of considerations, the most important of which were the simi-
larity of the restrictions under review to those at issue in Pacifica,304
the fact that the statute regulated “channels over which cable opera-
tors have not historically exercised editorial control,”305 and the fact
that programming on public access channels is generally subject to re-
view by an access channel manager who can exercise editorial discre-
tion in the cable operator’s stead.306
The viability of each of these rationales with respect to cable is
open to question,307 particularly in the aftermath of the Court’s subse-
300 Denver Area Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
301 Id. at 732–33.
302 Id. at 742 (plurality opinion); accord id. at 768 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 775–77
(Souter, J., concurring); id. at 779–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
303 See id. at 780–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part); id. at 813, 817–18 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
304 See id. at 744–45 (plurality opinion); id. at 779–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
305 Id. at 761 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 793, 800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
306 See id. at 761–64 (plurality opinion).
307 Courts have long recognized that technological differences (particularly cable’s ability
to block unwanted channels on a household-by-household basis) render Pacifica inapplicable to
cable. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000); Quincy Cable
TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420
(11th Cir. 1985); Cmty. Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1167–68 (D. Utah
1982).  In addition, allowing previous regulation that had long deprived cable operators of edito-
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quent decision in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc.308  Whatever the continuing viability of these justifications for
cable, they appear to have no applicability whatsoever to the Internet.
As noted earlier, the Court’s landmark decision in Reno v. ACLU
held Pacifica squarely inapplicable to the Internet.309  In addition, un-
like cable operators, Internet providers have never been deprived of
editorial discretion over any of their transmission capacity.310
In short, the Supreme Court’s cable precedents provide no sup-
port for interfering with Internet intermediaries’ editorial discretion.
On the contrary, these cases are replete with statements acknowledg-
ing that cable operators’ exercises of editorial discretion promote free
speech values.  Even those decisions that extended a lesser degree of
First Amendment protection to cable operators recognize that, while
audiences have an interest in access to speech, that interest must be
balanced against the impairment of the free speech interests repre-
sented by the editorial discretion exercised by cable operators.311
Thus, at a minimum, these cases recognize that cable operators’ exer-
cises of editorial discretion serve important free speech values.  The
inapplicability of the rationales invoked to justify extending a lower
level of First Amendment protection to cable suggests that the interest
in preserving editorial discretion should predominate.
D. Recognition of the Importance of Telephone Companies’
Editorial Discretion
Determining the level of First Amendment protection enjoyed by
common carriers has long remained something of a puzzle.  Commen-
tators have been struck by the paucity of judicial decisions discussing
rial discretion and the presence of an “access channel manager” who can exercise editorial dis-
cretion to justify limitations on a cable operator’s free speech rights is tantamount to allowing
past regulation to serve as a constitutional justification for more regulation.  Yoo, supra note 17,
at 270–71.
308 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000). Playboy appeared to
do away with all of the various lower levels of First Amendment scrutiny put forward by the
Denver plurality and instead subjected the regulation in question to strict scrutiny. Id. at 813–15.
The most telling sign is the fact that Justice Breyer’s dissent agreed that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard. Id. at 836 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Indeed, Justice Breyer seemed to chide
the majority for suggesting that he might have thought otherwise. Id. at 836.  In the aftermath of
a decision unanimously recognizing that restrictions of indecency on cable television are subject
to strict scrutiny, it is hard to see how any of the justifications articulated by the Denver plurality
for subjecting cable television to a lesser First Amendment standard remain good law.
309 See supra notes 222–25 and accompanying text.
310 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–69 (1997) (noting that the Internet has never been
subject to intrusive regulation).
311 Denver, 518 U.S. at 743 (plurality opinion).
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the relationship between common carriage regulation and the First
Amendment.312  Indeed, aside from a few brief mentions noting that
common carriers receive even less First Amendment protection than
broadcasters,313 courts have hardly commented on the issue at all.
Commentators who have tried to synthesize the doctrine have found a
tripartite First Amendment, in which print receives the highest level
of protection, broadcasting receives somewhat less, and common car-
riers receive the least.314  Others have suggested that, because the con-
tent is entirely in the control of the subscriber, the only First
Amendment interests at stake are those of the subscribers, and the
free speech interests of the carrier are not implicated at all.315
Since the late 1980s, decisions by lower federal courts have begun
to recognize that editorial discretion serves free speech values even
when exercised by common carriers.316  The discussion that follows fo-
cuses primarily on two lines of cases.  The first upheld local telephone
companies’ rights to refuse to carry dial-a-porn.  The second recog-
nized local telephone companies’ rights to transmit cable television
312 See, e.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 102–06 (1983); Susan
Dente Ross, First Amendment Trump?: The Uncertain Constitutionality of Structural Regulation
Separating Telephone and Video, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 281, 299 (1998).
313 See Denver, 518 U.S. at 739 (plurality opinion); FCC v. League of Women Voters of
Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984).  For example, the Supreme Court offered the tangential observa-
tion in League of Women Voters that, “[u]nlike common carriers, broadcasters are entitled under
the First Amendment to exercise the widest journalistic freedom possible consistent with their
public [duties].” League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 378 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S.
367, 395 (1981)).  Although this brief statement clearly implies that common carriers’ First
Amendment rights to editorial discretion are narrower than those of broadcasters, this statement
simply makes a relative comparison that offers no clear statement about the First Amendment
standard to be applied to common carriers.  Similarly, in rejecting a First Amendment challenge
to a provision of the consent decree that broke up AT&T, which prevented the newly formed
local telephone companies from entering into electronic publishing, the court asserted that
“common carriers are quite properly treated differently for First Amendment purposes than
traditional news media.”  United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 586 n.273 (D.D.C.
1987).  The court made this assertion without analysis.
314 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 14.6.1, at
1279 (2d ed. 1999); POOL, supra note 312, at 2; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 12–25, at 1003–04 (2d ed. 1988); ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 19, § 2.3(A)(iii), at
185–89.
315 See Baker, supra note 19, at 42 n.144; Jerome A. Barron, The Telco, the Common Car-
rier Model and the First Amendment—The “Dial-a-Porn” Precedent, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 371, 382 (1993); Ross, supra note 312, at 295; see also Denver, 518 U.S. at 796 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (conclud-
ing that, to the extent that the cable operator is not exercising its own discretion, “the cable
operator’s rights [do not] inform this analysis”).
316 See infra Part II.D.1–2.
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programming.  Together, these decisions suggest ways that even com-
mon carriers are important sources of intermediation.
1. Dial-a-Porn
Although there were historical antecedents upholding common
carriers’ rights to refuse to transmit content that is profane, indecent,
or rude,317 the issue came to a head with the emergence of dial-a-porn.
Dial-a-porn marked a sea change in telephony.  Instead of connecting
two people speaking to each other, dial-a-porn more resembled a
broadcast technology that permitted a single, one-way message to
reach thousands of callers.318  As telephone companies began to carry
mass-media content, two consequences followed.  First, governments
began to want to exercise discretion over the content being carried on
the telephone networks in much the way they did over broadcast con-
tent.  Second, telephone carriers began to want to exercise editorial
discretion over that content as well.
The first issue reached the Supreme Court in Sable, in which the
Court struck down a federal statute banning indecent interstate tele-
phone messages.319 Sable is important for several reasons.  First, that
the Court employed strict scrutiny to strike down a restriction on tele-
phone-based speech belies any suggestion that telephone communica-
tion is subject only to the “most limited First Amendment
protection.”320  Second, the majority opinion focused almost entirely
on the First Amendment rights of subscribers connected to the net-
work; it did not address the second issue—the rights of telephone
companies to refuse to carry indecent speech—at all.321  Discussion of
this issue was left to Justice Scalia’s concurrence, in which he observed
that, “while we hold the Constitution prevents Congress from banning
indecent speech in this fashion, we do not hold that the Constitution
requires public utilities to carry it.”322  Justice Scalia’s statement im-
plicitly recognized the possibility that telephone companies may pos-
sess the editorial discretion to refuse to carry particular calls
notwithstanding their status as common carriers.
317 See HUBER ET AL., supra note 314, § 14.6, at 1275–76 (discussing an 1883 Ohio case
upholding a local telephone company’s right to refuse to serve a customer who had used
profanity).
318 See Carlin Commc’ns, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th
Cir. 1987).
319 Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
320 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
321 Sable, 492 U.S. at 126–28.
322 Id. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia’s admonition agreed with a line of lower court deci-
sions upholding local telephone companies’ rights not to carry dial-a-
porn if they so chose.323  Some cases held that the First Amendment
did not apply because telephone companies are not state actors,324 rea-
soning later endorsed by Justice Thomas.325  In so holding, these
courts recognize common carriers as private speakers with the right to
choose the speech that they carry.326
More importantly, other courts have held that common carriage
regulation does not foreclose telephone companies from exercising
their business judgment to refuse to carry certain classes of service.327
As one noted commentator has observed, upholding telephone com-
panies’ rights to exercise their business judgment is essentially the
same thing as upholding their rights to exercise their own editorial
discretion.328
2. Ban on Telephone Companies’ Provision of Cable
Television Services
The other line of authority recognizing common carriers’ rights to
exercise editorial discretion arose from a series of First Amendment
challenges to laws prohibiting local telephone companies from offer-
ing cable television service.329  Courts consistently held that this re-
striction impermissibly impaired the telephone companies’ abilities to
323 See Mountain States, 827 F.2d at 1293–95; Carlin Commc’n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir. 1986); Network Commc’ns v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 703 F. Supp.
1267, 1275 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see also Info. Providers’ Coal. for Def. of First Amendment v.
FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 877 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that “a carrier is free under the Constitution to
terminate service to dial-a-porn operators altogether”).
324 See Info. Providers’ Coal., 928 F.2d at 877; Mountain States, 827 F.2d at 1297; S. Bell, 802
F.2d at 1357–62; Network Commc’ns, 703 F. Supp. at 1274–77.
325 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 825 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Common carriers are
private entities and may, consistent with the First Amendment, exercise editorial discretion in
the absence of a statutory prohibition.”).
326 Allen S. Hammond, Regulating the Multi-Media Chimera: Electronic Speech Rights in
the United States, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 11 (1995).
327 See Mountain States, 827 F.2d at 1294; see also Network Commc’ns, 703 F. Supp. at 1276
(relying on the telephone company’s exercise of business judgment to hold that its refusal to
carry dial-a-porn did not constitute state action).
328 Barron, supra note 315, at 386.
329 This restriction was first instituted by FCC rule. See Application of Telephone Cos. for
Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Tele-
vision Systems, Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 325 ¶ 49 (1970), aff’d sub nom. Gen.
Tel. Co. of Sw. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).  It was later codified by Congress.
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779, 2785 (previ-
ously codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994)).
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engage in a form of protected speech.330  The most complete analysis
was offered by the Fourth Circuit in Chesapeake & Potomac Tele-
phone Co. of Virginia v. United States.331  In a statement somewhat in
tension with the dial-a-porn precedents, the court recognized that the
statute prohibiting local telephone companies from exercising edito-
rial control over telephone calls meant that they are not “members of
‘the press’” with respect to telephone service.332  Even so, to the ex-
tent that a statute restricts them from “joining the press by operat-
ing . . . cable systems” complete “with editorial control,” that statute
implicates the First Amendment.333
Thus, even if local telephone companies were serving as common
carriers with respect to voice communications, to the extent that they
wished to begin providing video service, the First Amendment pro-
tected their rights to exercise editorial discretion over the content of
that service.  The fact that a firm may be providing common carriage
for a service over which it exercises little or no editorial control does
not prevent it from offering another service over which it can exercise
editorial control.  This provided a nice counterpoint to the recognition
in CBS v. DNC, Midwest Video II, and Denver that firms that are al-
ready providing media content cannot be forced to become common
carriers.334
Together, these cases establish some basic principles that apply to
the Internet.  First, a provider that is currently exercising editorial dis-
cretion over the content it is carrying cannot, consistent with accepted
free speech principles, be forced to become a common carrier.  In-
deed, the district court in Broward County applied just such a princi-
ple when it rejected the argument that a cable modem provider that
was exercising editorial discretion over its content could be forced to
set aside part of its service for common carriage.335  Although some
330 See US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and
remanded for consideration of mootness, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.
of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 190 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded for consideration
of mootness, 516 U.S. 415 (1996); S. New England Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211, 217
(D. Conn. 1995); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, No. Civ. 93-323-P-C, 1994 WL 779761, at *2
(D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1994);
BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Ala. 1994); US West, Inc. v.
United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
331 Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
332 Id. at 196.
333 Id.
334 See supra notes 135, 137, 141, 232–36, 240 and accompanying text.
335 Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685,
692 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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commentators have questioned whether Internet providers’ services
are worthy of First Amendment protection,336 most commentators rec-
ognize that these services promote important free speech values.337
That Internet providers exercise some degree of editorial discre-
tion is reinforced by the history of defamation liability for ISPs.  Carri-
ers that have no editorial discretion would be immune from liability
for defamation.338  Thus, the fact that courts issuing decisions prior to
the enactment of the Communications Decency Act have held ISPs
potentially liable for defamation339 implicitly recognizes that ISPs ex-
ercise some degree of editorial discretion.  Congress subsequently in-
cluded a provision in the Communications Decency Act effectively
granting ISPs immunity from defamation.340  In fact, the conference
report indicates that Congress included this provision specifically to
overrule the cases finding liability for defamation.341  If the ISP had no
editorial discretion, such statutory immunity would have been unnec-
essary.  Moreover, a subsequent section of the same statute grants im-
munity for good Samaritan blocking and screening of material that is
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable.”342  In so doing, the statute implicitly recog-
nizes the benefits flowing from ISPs’ exercises of editorial discretion.
Indeed, courts have consistently held that ISPs may exercise such dis-
cretion without raising First Amendment concerns.343
336 See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 1190–92 (search engines); Herman, supra note
13, at 112–13 (last-mile broadband providers).
337 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  Those who remain skeptical should bear in
mind that movies and entertainment programming were once seen as falling outside the ambit of
the First Amendment. See Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 243–44 (1915)
(movies); Decision of Aug. 29, 1928, 2 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 159, 161 (1928) (entertainment pro-
gramming).  These cases are part of a long tradition in which new technologies are born in First
Amendment captivity. See ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 19, § 2.2, at 165–73.
338 See HUBER ET AL., supra note 314, § 14.6.7, at 1308; see also Farmers Educ. & Coop.
Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 526–27, 535 (1959) (holding a broadcaster immune
from defamation liability for political advertisement that the broadcaster was obligated to carry
and over which the broadcaster was prohibited from exercising editorial discretion).
339 See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 94-031063, 1995 WL 323710,
at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (concluding that the ISP’s “conscious choice to gain the
benefits of editorial control . . . opened itself up to greater liability,” thus allowing the ISP to be
potentially liable for defamation).
340 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
341 H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
207–08.
342 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
343 See Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003); Langdon v. Google,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630–31 (D. Del. 2007).
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Second, a firm that is a common carrier certainly has the right to
offer alternative services over which it does exercise editorial control.
Thus, even if an Internet provider has not historically exercised edito-
rial control over certain services, the government cannot, without vio-
lating the First Amendment, stop it from initiating a new service over
which it does exercise editorial discretion.
E. Implications
Together, these various lines of jurisprudence recognized that the
exercise of editorial discretion by intermediaries facilitating electronic
communication serves important free speech values.  The Court has
consistently recognized that restriction on their editorial discretion is
inappropriate even if these intermediaries wield market power, simply
serve as conduits for the speech of others, or exercise their discretion
in what others feel is a biased manner.344
At a minimum, intermediaries’ rights as speakers represent an
important countervailing consideration that any free speech calculus
must weigh in the balance.345  A fair reading of the cases would go
even further: given that none of the rationales previously used to jus-
tify restricting the free speech rights of broadcasters and cable opera-
tors applies to the Internet, these precedents indicate that Internet
intermediaries, like newspaper publishers, possess “the absolute free-
dom to advocate [their] own positions without also presenting oppos-
ing viewpoints.”346
The real possibility that intermediation can yield significant bene-
fits poses a significant analytical problem for those who seek to place
limits on Internet providers’ freedoms to play this intermediating role
as they see fit.  The recognized benefits of editorial discretion under-
cut categorical arguments in favor of mandating complete
nonintermediation and force proponents of nonintermediation to pro-
vide some basis for distinguishing between forms of intermediation
that are permissible and those that are not.  As we shall see, the his-
tory of previous efforts to draw such a distinction raises serious doubts
as to the likely success of any such enterprise.
344 See supra Parts II.B and C.
345 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 226–27 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part).
346 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
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III. Lessons from Past Attempts to Regulate Editorial Discretion
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the
Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934 embraced the
important role that broadcasters’ exercises of editorial discretion play
in promoting free speech values.347  Nonetheless, both the FCC and its
predecessor, the FRC, have exhibited considerable ambivalence to-
ward permitting broadcasters to exercise their editorial discretion in
an unfettered manner.  On the one hand, the rules against time bro-
kering have attempted to prevent broadcasters from exercising too lit-
tle editorial control by limiting their ability to cede control over
broadcast content to third parties.  On the other hand, the FRC’s his-
torical hostility toward “propaganda stations” and the Fairness Doc-
trine (and its antecedents) have attempted to prevent them from
exercising too much editorial control.
As the subsequent history reveals, neither effort proved success-
ful.  In both cases, the agencies were unable to develop standards for
distinguishing between proper and improper exercises of editorial dis-
cretion.  The ambiguity had the unfortunate impact of chilling broad-
cast speech and making it more orthodox.  Even worse, political
operatives were able to use the rules to create systematic campaigns to
deter the speech of the opposition.
A. Time Brokerage: Regulating Too Little Editorial Discretion
The FRC and FCC have a long history of attempting to ensure
that broadcasters do not exercise too little editorial discretion.  Inter-
estingly, beginning in 1921 and prior to selling its stations to RCA in
1926, AT&T adopted the type of pure-conduit approach that the pro-
ponents of nonintermediation favor by offering to carry the program-
ming of anyone willing to pay a posted slate of toll rates.348
Then–Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover criticized the practice,
primarily because of the amount of direct advertising that AT&T’s
stations carried, but demurred from intervening and left it to the in-
dustry to work out how much advertising would be permissible.349
Policymakers soon began to express greater skepticism about
such an unintermediated approach to broadcasting.  In its 1929 denial
347 See supra notes 130–54 and accompanying text.
348 Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional “Broadcast” and Wire-
less “Carriage,” 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1052–53 (1997).
349 Id. at 1053 (citing 1 ERIK BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES: A TOWER IN BABEL 34, 177–78 (1966)); see also HUBER ET AL., supra note 314, § 1.2.4,
at 11; POOL, supra note 312, at 35, 136–38.
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of a request by three broadcasters to increase the amount of broad-
casting time permitted by their licenses, the FRC rejected extending
the rules governing telephony and telegraphy to broadcasting, under
which “a broadcasting station would have to accept and transmit for
all persons on an equal basis without discrimination in charge.”350  Do-
ing so would deprive the public of the editorial discretion exercised by
the broadcasters, described as “the self-imposed censorship exercised
by the program directors of broadcasting stations who, for the sake of
the popularity and standing of their stations, will select entertainment
and educational features according to the needs and desires of their
invisible audiences.”351  The FRC recognized the benefits that inter-
mediation provides to audiences when it reasoned that preventing
broadcasters from exercising their editorial discretion would “empha-
size the right of the sender of messages to the detriment of the listen-
ing public.”352  Commentators regard the FRC’s emphasis on the
importance of broadcasters’ editorial discretion as foreclosing the type
of unintermediated toll broadcasting system operated by AT&T dur-
ing the 1920s,353 although the FCC has sometimes praised licensees for
serving as a conduit for others’ speech.354
In subsequent decades, the FCC’s primary tool for ensuring that
broadcasters exercise some degree of editorial discretion has been its
policy against “time brokerage,” which occurs when a station sells
blocks of broadcast time to a third party.355  The FCC was quite criti-
cal of time brokerage during its early years.  For example, in 1940, the
existence of a contract designating NBC as the sole supplier of pro-
gramming for four radio stations owned by Westinghouse led the FCC
to threaten not to renew those stations until Westinghouse replaced
that contract with a more conventional network affiliation agreement,
under which Westinghouse bore ultimate responsibility for the pro-
350 Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 32 (1929), aff’d, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.
1930).
351 Id. at 32–33.
352 Id. at 33.
353 Shelanski, supra note 348, at 1055.
354 See Adelaide Lillian Carrell, Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the Commis-
sion, 7 F.C.C. 219, 221–22 ¶ 10 (1939) (proposed findings of fact and conclusions).
355 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 note 2(j) (2007).  For the history of time-brokerage regulation, see
Michael E. Lewyn, When Is Time Brokerage a Transfer of Control? The FCC’s Regulation of
Local Marketing Agreements and the Need for Rulemaking, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 1, 9–45 (1995); Stephen F. Sewell, The Federal Communications Commission and
Time Brokerage: A Regulatory Change of Course, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 89, 90–98 (1995).
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gramming broadcast by its stations.356  In its 1941 Metropolitan Broad-
casting Corp. decision,357 the FCC denied the current licensee’s
request for renewal in part because he had regularly delegated nearly
half of the station’s operating schedule to time brokers.358  In 1963, the
FCC revoked a license held by Carol Music, Inc., in part because it
had entered into a time-brokerage agreement covering twelve hours a
day for six days a week.359  In 1965 and 1966, the FCC fined broadcast-
ers for entering into time-brokerage agreements.360  Even more nota-
ble was the FCC’s 1976 decision in Cosmopolitan Broadcasting
Corp.,361 in which the FCC refused to renew the license of a radio
station that sold “virtually every available minute” to time brokers.362
A de facto rule emerged that time brokerage was permissible so
long as it did not become so “extensive” as to violate the broadcasters’
obligations to retain control over program content at all times.363  In
short, broadcasters were permitted to serve as a mere conduit up to a
point, but no further.  Interestingly, this approach would condemn the
kind of unintermediated, dumb-conduit approach favored by propo-
nents of regulation, and it clearly envisions editorial discretion as a
good that must be preserved rather than condemned.  More impor-
tantly, the FCC was somewhat vague about precisely how much time
brokerage was permissible.  As a procedural matter, the FCC initially
required broadcasters to submit all time-brokerage contracts to the
FCC,364 although a later amendment relaxed that requirement and in-
356 Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., Opinion and Order on Petition to Reconsider and
Grant Without Hearing, 8 F.C.C. 195, 195–96 (1940).
357 Metro. Broad. Corp., Findings of Fact and Conclusions, 8 F.C.C. 558 (1941).
358 Id. at 563 ¶¶ 20–21, 575.
359 Revocation of License and Subsidiary Communications Authorization of Carol Music,
Inc., for FM Broadcast Station WCLJ, Preliminary Statement, 37 F.C.C. 385, 389–91 ¶¶ 10–13,
400–01 (1963).
360 WGOK, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 245, 246 ¶¶ 6–9 (1965);
United Broad. Co., of N.Y., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 40 F.C.C. 224, 229 ¶¶ 21–23
(1965).
361 Cosmopolitan Broad. Corp., Decision, 59 F.C.C.2d 558 (1976), remanded on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
362 Id. at 560 ¶ 5, 561 ¶ 7.  The D.C. Circuit characterized the scope of the time-brokerage
agreement somewhat differently, noting that over seventy-five percent of the station’s time was
sold to time brokers, with approximately twenty percent of the remaining time sold or given to
others for religious broadcasts. Cosmopolitan Broad., 581 F.2d at 919.
363 See Cosmopolitan Broad., 59 F.C.C.2d at 560–61 ¶ 6; see also Welcome Radio, Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 582, 583 ¶ 4 (1969).
364 Financial Ownership and Other Reports of Broadcast Licensees, 10 Fed. Reg. 9718,
9718–19 (Aug. 7, 1945) (requiring submission of contracts for “bulk time sales” of two hours or
more).
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stead allowed stations to retain such contracts at the station for FCC
inspection.365
The ambiguities about what degree of delegation of editorial dis-
cretion was too extensive soon began to pose problems.  In certain
cases, the FCC applied its policies to brokerage arrangements that
covered as little as ten minutes a week.366  The FCC also initially ap-
plied its time-brokerage rules to barter arrangements, such as when a
syndicated programmer sells spot advertising contained within a block
of time that it has purchased,367 only to back away from them a few
years later.368  Even so, the FCC continued to warn that extensive use
of time-brokerage arrangements could violate the station’s responsi-
bility to maintain editorial control over its programming.369
A 1980 policy statement marked a sea change in the FCC’s views
of time brokerage.  Rather than expressing hostility toward time bro-
kerage, the FCC adopted a policy of “foster[ing] time brokerage ar-
rangements” as a way to “encourage minority group involvement in
broadcasting.”370  Additionally, the FCC hoped that changing its
stance on time brokerage would promote programming targeted at
“specialized audiences whose tastes continue to go unmet because
they are too small to support an entire weekly schedule of such pro-
gramming,” such as foreign-language programming.371  That said, the
FCC disavowed any “inten[t] to transform the radio service into a
common carrier,”372 and it continued to emphasize that each broad-
caster bore ultimate responsibility for the programming transmitted
by its facility.373  The FCC rejected ex ante review of time-brokerage
agreements out of concern that such review might stifle the practice,
instead preferring to “deal with such problems when they occur.”374  It
365 Re-regulation of Radio and Television Broadcasting, 25 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1719,
1722 ¶ 5(g) (Nov. 2, 1972).
366 See Eller Telecasting Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.2d 913, 913–14
¶ 4 (1969) (applying the time-brokerage regulations to a ten-minute weekly newscast targeted at
Hispanic audiences); WGOK, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 245, 245 ¶ 2
(1965) (applying the time-brokerage requirements to fifteen-minute Sunday programs sold to
amateur singers).
367 See Rand Broad. Co., 22 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 155, 155–56 (June 9, 1971).
368 Clarifying Paragraph (c) of Section 1.613, Concerning the Filing of Agreements Involv-
ing the Sale of Broadcast Time for Resale, Order, 33 F.C.C.2d 653, 654 ¶¶ 4–7 (1972).
369 Id. at 653–54 ¶ 3.
370 Petition for Issuance of Policy Statement or Notice Inquiry on Part-Time Programming,
Policy Statement, 82 F.C.C.2d 107, 107–09 ¶¶ 1–4 & n.8, 120 ¶ 31 (1980).
371 Id. at 120 ¶ 31.
372 Id. at 114 ¶ 17.
373 Id. at 109 ¶ 5, 113 ¶ 15.
374 Id. at 112–13 ¶¶ 13–14, 114 ¶ 17.
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implicitly rejected establishing any clear numerical guidelines, con-
cluding that “the amount of time brokerage is not really the issue.
Instead it is the degree to which the licensee abdicated its responsibil-
ity to the time brokers.”375  The FCC also refused to issue clearer rules
for the benefit of inexperienced independent producers largely on the
grounds that the existing case-by-case approach had not proven too
onerous and that broadcasters were in a position to provide these in-
dependent producers with clear guidance.376  Finally, the FCC rejected
calls for preventing broadcasters from engaging in censorship, ruling
instead that the public interest would be better served by continuing
to hold the broadcaster responsible for its editorial decisions.377
As deregulation facilitated entry by new radio stations through-
out the 1980s, radio stations began to use time brokerage for more
than just specialized programming, often expanding it to cover all of
the available broadcast time.378  In 1989, the FCC further liberalized
its time-brokerage policy by permitting one station to broker time for
another station operating in the same market.379  Beginning with the
FCC’s landmark Russo decision,380 the FCC explicitly condoned many
of these more extensive time-brokerage agreements,381 eventually
codifying this broader embrace of time brokerage in its rules.382  Even
so, the FCC stopped short of a full embrace of nonintermediation,
emphasizing broadcasters’ continuing responsibilities to exercise edi-
torial control over all programming transmitted383 and rejecting cer-
tain brokerage agreements when station owners abdicated this
responsibility.384
375 Id. at 114 ¶ 17.
376 Id. at 114 ¶ 18.
377 Id. at 118–19 ¶¶ 28–29.
378 Lewyn, supra note 355, at 11–12.
379 Reexamination of the Commission’s Cross-Interest Policy, Policy Statement, 4 F.C.C.R.
2208, 2214 ¶¶ 37–39 (1989).
380 Roy R. Russo, Esq., Letter, 5 F.C.C.R. 7586, 7587 (1990).
381 See Lewyn, supra note 355, at 4 & n.12; Sewell, supra note 355, at 98.
382 Revision of Radio Rules & Policies, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2787 ¶ 63
(1992), reconsidered, 7 F.C.C.R. 6387 (1992) (First Reconsideration Order), reconsidered, 9
F.C.C.R. 7183 (1994) (Second Reconsideration Order).  The rules did prohibit stations operating
in the same market from using time brokerage to duplicate more than twenty-five percent of
their programming. Id. at 2789 ¶ 66.  Time brokerage of more than fifteen percent of the time of
another station would constitute co-ownership for purposes of the local and national ownership
rules. Id. at 2788–89 ¶ 65.
383 Revision of Radio Rules & Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. at 2787 ¶ 63; accord First Reconsideration
Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6401 ¶ 63 (“[W]e emphasize that the licensee is ultimately responsible for
all programming aired on its station, regardless of its source.”).
384 See Lewyn, supra note 355, at 5–6 n.13.
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More importantly, the FCC continued to be unable to articulate a
clear standard for what represented an acceptable degree of
nonintermediation, instead adhering to a case-by-case approach.385
Some commentators have criticized the FCC’s new time-brokerage
policies as too permissive and argued that they lessened program di-
versity.386  Moreover, others have struggled to determine the basis on
which some time-brokerage agreements were approved or rejected,
and these scholars argue that the case-by-case approach has produced
a regulatory muddle that provides no meaningful guidance.387  The
FCC has consistently refused to heed calls to provide clearer stan-
dards on the grounds that the case-by-case approach preserves broad-
caster flexibility.388
B. The Fairness Doctrine: Regulating Too Much
Editorial Discretion
At the same time that the FRC and FCC have struggled to delin-
eate when broadcasters are exercising too little editorial control, they
have struggled even more controversially with standards for determin-
ing when broadcasters have exercised too much.389  Again, the early
days of the radio industry are instructive.  Some stations developed
distinctive editorial voices for particular points of view.  For example,
WEVD, based in New York City, served as “the mouthpiece of the
Socialist Party.”390  WIBA, based in Madison, Wisconsin, spoke for the
Progressive movement of Robert LaFollette.391  WCFL in Chicago of-
fered programming of interest to organized labor.392
During its second year of existence, the FRC was somewhat toler-
ant of these stations.  In fact, the FRC declared in August 1928 that
that it would “not draw the line on any station . . . [that] is the mouth-
385 Second Reconsideration Order, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7192 ¶ 54; First Reconsideration Order, 7
F.C.C.R. at 6401 ¶ 63; see also Revision of Radio Rules & Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. at 2789 ¶ 67
(opting for overseeing time-brokerage contracts through a complaint-and-compliance process
rather than advance rules).
386 Sewell, supra note 355, at 99–100.
387 Lewyn, supra note 355, at 45–48, 56–57; see also Brooke Commc’ns, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Forfeiture Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 6247, 6249 ¶ 7 (1999).
388 See Second Reconsideration Order, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7192 ¶ 54.
389 The discussion that follows draws heavily on the excellent critique of the Fairness Doc-
trine by Thomas Krattenmaker and Lucas Powe. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 28, at
61–65, 237–75.
390 C.A. Cummins, 2 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 159, 160 (Aug. 29, 1928).
391 Id.
392 Chi. Fed’n of Labor v. FRC, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 36, 36 (1929).
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piece of a substantial political or religious minority” so long as the
station programmed “with due regard for the opinions of others.”393
By 1929, however, the FRC had grown more skeptical of stations
with such distinctive editorial voices.  Its Great Lakes Broadcasting
decision394 raised concerns that such editorial discretion might be ap-
plied too vigorously, such as when a broadcaster transmits programs
that are “interesting or valuable to[ ] only a small portion of the pub-
lic” or serve “the private interests of individuals or groups.”395  The
FRC condemned such stations as “propaganda stations,” a term that
the FRC feebly attempted to soften by claiming that it was “used for
the sake of convenience and not in a derogatory sense.”396  The FRC
justified its criticism by invoking the now-discredited scarcity doctrine.
Because “[t]here is not room in the broadcast band for every school of
thought, religious, political, social, and economic, each to have its sep-
arate broadcasting station, its mouthpiece in the ether,” each broad-
caster was obligated to offer a “well-rounded program” that met “the
tastes, needs, and desires of all substantial groups among the listening
public . . . in some fair proportion.”397  Indeed, the FRC would not
have licensed such propaganda stations at all had they not already
been established, and the Commission indicated that it would favor
applicants offering more general service if given the opportunity.398
In the decision immediately following Great Lakes Broadcasting,
the FRC denied a request by WCFL (operated by the Chicago Feder-
ation of Labor) for an increase in the power and number of hours that
it could transmit on the grounds that “there is no place for a station
catering to any group, but that all stations should cater to the general
public and serve public interest as against group or class interest.”399
But perhaps the most salient stand against editorial discretion
was the FRC’s termination of the radio station operated by “Fighting
Bob” Shuler, a minister who used both his pulpit and his enormously
popular radio station to criticize Los Angeles’s mayor, police chief,
393 Michael T. Rafferty, 2 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 154, 155 (Aug. 22, 1928); see also C.A. Cum-
mins, 2 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. at 160 (“Wherever the evidence is shown that a particular station is
serving as a mouthpiece for a substantial religious or political minority, no matter how much the
individual members of the commission may disagree with the views of that minority, the commis-
sion has taken action favorable to the station.”).
394 Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), aff ’d, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.
1930).
395 Id. at 34.
396 Id.
397 Id.
398 Id. at 35.
399 Chi. Fed’n of Labor v. FRC, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 36, 36 (1929).
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district attorney, city prosecutor, and bar association for corruption
and ties to organized crime.400  Needless to say, the programming
Shuler offered represented precisely the type of important political
speech that citizens needed.  Despite the presence of significant and
often uncontested evidence that most of Shuler’s accusations were
true, as well as a decision by the chief hearing examiner in Shuler’s
favor,401 the full FRC ruled against Shuler, in part because it deemed
his programs to be sensational rather than instructive.402  The D.C.
Circuit affirmed the FRC’s decision, and the Supreme Court declined
to review the case.403
Similarly, in its 1940 Mayflower Broadcasting Corp. decision,404
the FCC heavily criticized the Yankee Network’s policy of broadcast-
ing editorials supporting particular political candidates or political is-
sues, renewing its license only after the Yankee Network promised not
to editorialize further.405  In so doing, the FCC categorically declared
that a licensee’s programming “cannot be devoted to the support of
principles he happens to regard most favorably.  In brief, the broad-
caster cannot be an advocate.”406
Nine years later, the FCC abruptly reversed course and ruled in-
stead that broadcasters have the obligation to editorialize on public
issues of concerns to their audiences.407  At the same time, the FCC
ruled that broadcasters “must operate on a basis of overall fairness”
by “afford[ing] a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of all
responsible positions on matters of sufficient importance to be af-
forded radio time.”408  Initially, compliance with the Fairness Doctrine
was simply a consideration taken into account at renewal time, which
meant that enforcement amounted to little more than pious admoni-
tions.409  The FCC began giving the doctrine real bite in 1962, when it
400 See Charley Orbison, “Fighting Bob” Shuler: Early Radio Crusader, 21 J. BROADCAST-
ING 459, 463–64 (1977); see also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 28, at 24–25, 27–28.
401 Orbison, supra note 400, at 463–64, 466.
402 Id. at 466; see also Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
403 Trinity Methodist Church, 62 F.2d at 854.
404 Mayflower Broad. Corp., Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions, 8 F.C.C. 333
(1940).
405 Id. at 339–41.
406 Id. at 340.
407 Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, Report of the Commission, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
1249–50 ¶¶ 6–7 (1949).
408 Id. at 1250 ¶ 7.
409 See Jerome A. Barron, The Federal Communications Commission’s Fairness Doctrine:
An Evaluation, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1961).
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started to act on fairness complaints as they arose.410  In its 1969 deci-
sion in Red Lion, the Supreme Court gave the doctrine its imprimatur
based largely on the now-discredited scarcity doctrine.411  Congress
subsequently attempted to pass a statute prohibiting public broadcast-
ers from editorializing,412 only to see this ban overturned by the Su-
preme Court in League of Women Voters.413  The FCC eventually
abolished the Fairness Doctrine in 1987.414
As was the case with the FCC’s attempt to restrict time broker-
age, both proponents and critics of the Fairness Doctrine acknowledge
that the FCC struggled to develop coherent criteria for resolving Fair-
ness Doctrine complaints.415  Moreover, the Fairness Doctrine soon
gave rise to a number of difficult implementation issues.  For example,
a group supporting the proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty successfully
argued that the Fairness Doctrine required that a station broadcasting
a sponsored program opposing the treaty had to provide air time for
the opposing point of view even if the group advocating the opposing
view was unable to pay for it.416
Subsequent FCC decisions extended the Fairness Doctrine to
commercial advertising.  Future law professor John Banzhaf success-
fully argued that a CBS affiliate’s broadcast of advertisements depict-
ing smoking as socially acceptable entitled him to free airtime for
programming depicting smoking’s potential harms.417  Despite the
410 KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 28, at 62–63.  The first instance appears to be
Complaint Under “Fairness Doctrine” Requirements, 40 F.C.C. 508 (1962).  For the FCC’s ratio-
nale for the change in policy, see “Fairness Doctrine” Implementation, 40 F.C.C. 582, 583–85
(1963).
411 Red Lion Broad., Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969).
412 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, sec. 1229, § 399, 95 Stat.
357, 730.
413 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984).
414 Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station WTVH Syracuse, New
York, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5043 ¶ 2 (1987), petition for review
denied, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding the Commission’s decision based on a public
interest rationale, without reaching the constitutional issue).
415 See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 28, at 261–70 (characterizing the Fairness
Doctrine as “an incoherent legal principle”); FORD ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS 51 (1984)
(noting that “[c]onfusion abounds” on the subject); Barron, supra note 409, at 18 (citing “the
absence of any system of criteria” for resolving fairness complaints).
416 Responsibility Under the Fairness Doctrine, 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
417 Complaint Directed to Station WCBS-TV, New York, N.Y., Concerning Fairness Doc-
trine, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, 382, reconsideration granted in part, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), clarified sub
nom. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 10 F.C.C.2d 16 (1967),
aff’d sub nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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FCC’s attempts to restrict its ruling to cigarettes,418 subsequent deci-
sions granted the Fairness Doctrine complaints with respect to adver-
tising by luxury car manufacturers419 and oil companies,420 while
rejecting claims that ads for trash compactors were a commentary on
recycling421 and that ads for Crest toothpaste represented commentary
on fluoridation of drinking water,422 just to cite a few examples.
Broadcasters became reluctant to sell advertising to organizations
such as oil companies or groups opposing a recycling referendum out
of fear of having to provide free airtime to those holding the opposing
point of view.423  The FCC subsequently reconsidered its position, is-
suing a new report overruling Banzhaf v. FCC424 and instead conclud-
ing that standard product commercials do not address controversial
issues of public importance sufficient to implicate the Fairness Doc-
trine.425  Subsequent challenges were resolved more easily.426
More importantly, in practice, the Fairness Doctrine tended to
chill the type of speech that it was ostensibly created to promote.  The
FCC has recognized that the doctrine’s first prong, obligating broad-
casters to cover controversial issues of interest to the communities
they serve, is essentially unenforceable.  Indeed, the FCC admitted,
“[W]e have no intention of becoming involved in the selection of is-
sues to be discussed, nor do we expect a broadcaster to cover each and
every important issue which may arise in his community.”427  As a re-
418 Television Station WCBS-TV, New York, N.Y., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9
F.C.C.2d 921, 942–43 ¶ 44 (1967).
419 See Complaint by Friends of the Earth Concerning Fairness Doctrine Re Station
WBNB-TV, New York, NY, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 750 (1970) (concluding that “the broadcaster does
have an obligation to inform the public . . . on [the] important issue[ ]” of air pollution caused by
automobiles), remanded sub nom. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
420 Complaint by Wilderness Society and Friends of the Earth Concerning Fairness Doc-
trine Re National Broadcasting Co., 30 F.C.C.2d 643, 646, reconsidered, 31 F.C.C.2d 729 (1971).
421 Complaint by John S. MacInnis, Consumers Arise Now, San Francisco, Cal. Concerning
Fairness Doctrine Re Station KGO-TV, 32 F.C.C.2d 837, 838 (1971).
422 Complaint by National Health Federation, Delaware, Ohio, Concerning Fairness Doc-
trine, 58 F.C.C.2d 314, 316 (1976).
423 Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning
the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 142,
175–78 ¶¶ 48–52 (1985) (1985 Fairness Report).
424 Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
425 Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Stan-
dards of the Communications Act, Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 24–26 ¶¶ 66–70 (1974) (1974
Fairness Report).
426 Complaint by Peter C. Herbst et al. Concerning Fairness Doctrine Re Station WMTW-
TV, 40 F.C.C.2d 115, 118 (1973) (rejecting Fairness Doctrine claim based on snowmobile adver-
tisements), aff’d sub nom. Pub. Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975).
427 1974 Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d at 10 ¶ 25.
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sult, a broadcaster’s decisions with respect to the first prong of the
Fairness Doctrine were entitled to a “presumption of compliance”428
and would violate the doctrine “[o]nly in rare instances.”429  As the
D.C. Circuit indicated, this obligation imposed by the first prong was
“not extensive and [can be] met by presenting a minimum of contro-
versial subject matter.”430  Indeed, on only one occasion did the FCC
sanction a station for its failure to cover a controversial issue, and that
case hardly arose under circumstances that reflected usual demands
by the listening audience.431  Broadcasters faced more significant risks
under the second prong if they failed to present the issues in a manner
that the FCC regards as sufficiently fair.  Thus, the best way for broad-
casters to avoid liability was simply to avoid covering controversial
issues altogether.  The effect was a net reduction in the amount of
speech that the Fairness Doctrine was designed to promote.  Moreo-
ver, the fact that broadcasters only needed to include “major” or “sig-
nificant” opinions had the inevitable effect of ensuring that what little
speech was presented was resolutely orthodox.432  Indeed, the broad-
428 Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Stan-
dards of the Communications Act, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 89 F.C.C.2d 916, 925 ¶ 23
(1982).
429 Complaint of Brent Buell, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 55, 57 ¶ 8
(1984).
430 Am. Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 444 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
431 This case arose when a Representative of Congress from Hawaii, who was the principal
sponsor of legislation to limit strip mining, asked a West Virginia radio station to air an eleven-
minute tape advocating her position during the time the legislation was being considered by
Congress and presented to the President for his signature.  Complaint of Representative Patsy
Mink et al. Against Radio Station WHAR, Clarksburg, W. Va., Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, 59 F.C.C.2d 987, 987 ¶ 2 (1976).  When the station refused, the Representative successfully
brought her Fairness Doctrine complaint.  Id. at 997 ¶ 30.  Somewhat curiously, one of the prin-
cipal bases for granting her claim was the fact that the local newspaper had covered the story on
its front page on nine days during the key eleven-day period when the legislation was being
debated and subjected to a presidential veto. Id. at 995 ¶ 24.  As Thomas Krattenmaker and
Lucas Powe point out, this rationale has the somewhat puzzling effect of allowing the fact that an
issue is already being covered extensively in other media to oblige broadcasters to provide dupli-
cate coverage. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 28, at 247.
432 See Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concern-
ing the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 142,
188–90 ¶¶ 69–71 (1985 Fairness Report); see also CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 187–88 (1973) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters generally tend to permit only
established—or at least moderated—views to enter the broadcast world’s ‘marketplace of
ideas.’”); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting) (“[C]ontroversial viewpoint[s] [are] being screened out in favor of the dreary
blandness of a more acceptable opinion.”); KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 28, at 248;
Barron, supra note 409, at 14 (“On those issues which are unquestionably controversial, how-
ever, it is obvious that little or no editorializing is done.”).
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casters for whom the Fairness Doctrine posed the most trouble were
those who devoted the most time to controversial issues and offered
the most distinctive points of view.433
The Supreme Court relied on the danger that requirements of fair
coverage might chill political speech in invalidating a right of reply for
newspapers.434  The Court dismissed as “speculative” claims that the
Fairness Doctrine would have the same impact on broadcasting and
explained that, “if experience with the administration of those doc-
trines indicates that they have the net effect of reducing rather than
enhancing the volume and quality of coverage, there will be time
enough to reconsider the constitutional implications.”435
Better empirical information is now available.  The FCC amassed
an impressive array of anecdotes indicating that the Fairness Doctrine
had the net effect of suppressing political speech.436  The fact that the
Fairness Doctrine was promulgated in 1949 (after a long period in
which all editorializing by broadcasters was prohibited) and subse-
quently abolished in 1987 provides a basis for a natural experiment as
to its likely impact.  Although detailed data regarding the 1949 change
is not available, the consensus is that imposing the Fairness Doctrine
did not lead to an increase in political speech.437  More detailed infor-
mation is available concerning the effect of the 1987 repeal.  Empirical
studies indicate that the total amount of informational programming
carried by broadcasters has skyrocketed since 1987, primarily in the
form of talk radio.438  Although many long for an idealized conception
of reasoned discourse associated with Founding-era works such as The
Federalist and Common Sense, the actual media discourse of that time
bears a distinct kinship to the political speech on today’s airwaves, in
433 See 1985 Fairness Report, 102 F.C.C.2d at 189–90 ¶ 71 & nn.168–69.
434 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) (“Faced with the
penalties [of the challenged statute] . . . editors might well conclude that the safe course is to
avoid controversy.  Therefore, . . . political and electoral coverage would be blunted or
reduced.”).
435 Red Lion Broad., Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969); see also FCC v. League of
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378 n.12 (1984) (noting that “were it to be shown by the
Commission that the fairness doctrine ‘[has] the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing’
speech, we would then be forced to reconsider the constitutional basis of our decision in [Red
Lion]”).
436 1985 Fairness Report, 102 F.C.C.2d at 164–88 ¶¶ 34–68.
437 See, e.g., Irving E. Fang & John W. Whelan, Jr., Survey of Television Editorials and
Ombudsman Segments, 17 J. BROADCASTING 363, 363–70 (1973); see also Barron, supra note
409, at 12 (“Although the Mayflower ban was removed more than a decade ago, editorializing by
broadcast licensees has by no means become a prevalent practice.” (footnote omitted)).
438 Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a “Chilling Effect”?
Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 290–301 (1997).
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that both are characterized by passionate advocacy of partisan posi-
tions.439  Moreover, it is far from clear that such dissensus should be
regretted or discouraged.  Quite the contrary, dissensus is often the
sign of a healthy pluralistic society.440
Perhaps most troublesome is the ease with which political opera-
tives were able to use the Fairness Doctrine as a means to silence po-
litical opposition. Mayflower Broadcasting had been prompted by the
Yankee Network’s criticism of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.441
Perhaps most ironically, contemporary observers have now chronicled
that Red Lion, the touchstone for efforts to cabin media speakers’ edi-
torial discretion, was the product of a systematic (and quite successful)
campaign by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to discourage
broadcasters from carrying programming sympathetic to the opposi-
tion.442  As one of President Kennedy’s Assistant Secretaries of Com-
merce admitted: “Our massive strategy was to use the Fairness
Doctrine to challenge and harass right-wing broadcasters in the hope
that the challenges would be so costly to them that they would be
inhibited and decide it was too expensive to continue.”443  Nor was
such conduct the exclusive province of the Democratic Party.  Richard
Nixon adopted similar tactics as part of his campaign against what he
characterized as the East Coast elitist media.444  In short, as Justice
Douglas so aptly observed, the Fairness Doctrine “puts the head of
the camel inside the tent and enables administration after administra-
tion to toy with TV or radio in order to serve its sordid or its benevo-
lent ends.”445
This underscores how government intervention can have an ad-
verse effect on free speech.  Even if undertaken for benign reasons,
the intervention may skew speech in unexpected and unintended
ways.446  Even worse, any system can be gamed, and actors inevitably
439 See Yoo, supra note 17, at 336–37 (citing L.A. Powe, Jr., Scholarship and Markets, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172, 183 (1987)).
440 See id. at 321 (quoting Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Mar-
ket, 82 GEO. L.J. 373, 385 (1993)).
441 See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
109–10 (1987).
442 See FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT: FREE SPEECH VS. FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING 33–42 (1975).
443 Id. at 39.
444 See Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, “Chilling” the Internet? Lessons from FCC
Regulation of Radio Broadcasting, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 47–50 (1998).
445 CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 154 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
446 See generally Yoo, supra note 284, at 675–713 (analyzing the problematic effects that
structural FCC regulations may have on media content).
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have strong incentives to use the rules to their maximum advantage.
Perhaps most problematic is the manner in which regulations designed
to temper extreme exercises of editorial discretion are vulnerable to
governmental abuse.447  Indeed, intermediaries are likely to be partic-
ularly susceptible to such manipulation.448  Although some commenta-
tors have expressed confidence that courts possess the doctrinal tools
to curb such abuses,449 I am less optimistic.450
Conclusion
In recent months, the newspapers have been filled with com-
plaints about how some Internet provider is discriminating against a
particular content or application provider.  Whether it is Comcast’s
policy toward the peer-to-peer client BitTorrent, Google’s decisions
about how to implement its search algorithm, Facebook’s decision not
to carry particular content, or Apple’s refusal to incorporate Google’s
voice apps into the iPhone,451 such actions have prompted cries that
Internet providers are harming free speech and must have their dis-
cretion restricted.
In advancing these arguments, these advocates overlook the long-
standing and important free speech tradition embodied in the Su-
preme Court’s mass-media jurisprudence that recognizes how
intermediaries’ exercises of editorial discretion can promote rather
than inhibit free speech values.  At a minimum, this tradition raises an
important countervailing consideration that any proponent of dis-
intermediating Internet content must take into account.  A fair read-
ing of these cases suggests that, given the inapplicability of the
considerations invoked to create exceptions for other electronic me-
dia, these intermediaries’ editorial discretion should be regarded as
inviolable.
In addition, any attempt to regulate the manner in which these
intermediaries sift through and present Internet content is likely to
affect speech markets in ways that can be quite problematic.  As I
have noted in my other work, no protocol is optimized for every appli-
447 Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning
the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 142,
192–94 ¶¶ 74–76 (1985) (1985 Fairness Report); accord Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 78 n.62 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he potential to subject
the ‘fairness’ theory to political abuse is inherent in the operation of the doctrine.”).
448 See Kreimer, supra note 10, at 27–33.
449 See id. at 46–79.
450 See Yoo, supra note 284, at 713–25.
451 See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text.
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cation; every Internet protocol inevitably favors some applications
and disfavors others.452  There is thus no principled basis for identify-
ing an approach to intermediation that is truly neutral.  Instead, regu-
lating intermediation inevitably places the government in the position
of picking technological winners and losers.  The history of past efforts
to regulate electronic intermediaries’ editorial discretion is not com-
forting.  Not only were policymakers unable to devise coherent crite-
ria for separating permissible exercises of editorial discretion from
impermissible ones, but the regulatory regime also had the unfortu-
nate side effect of skewing the debate and reducing the total amount
of speech.
In addition, this tradition reminds us of one of the First Amend-
ment’s central lessons: that government intervention poses a greater
threat to free speech than private action.  This is not to say that pri-
vate actors cannot skew the speech environment.  Clearly they can.
But our free speech principles are based on the conviction that “of
these two choices—private or official censorship—Government cen-
sorship would be the most pervasive, the most self-serving, the most
difficult to restrain and hence the one most to be avoided.”453  In
short, when choosing between government regulations to ensure that
each intermediary is everything to everyone, on the one hand, and
allowing audiences to choose from among intermediaries each exercis-
ing their own voice, on the other, free speech principles clearly regard
the latter as the lesser of the two evils.
This central insight gives new meaning to Lawrence Lessig’s ob-
servation that “code is law.”454  While some have taken the fact that
code represents an alternative form of governance as a justification
for government regulation, I take the opposite view.  The fact that
code affects speech means that we should exercise great caution
before permitting the government to regulate code.  Although many
scholars have advanced powerful arguments for transforming the First
Amendment from a negative restriction on the government into an
affirmative obligation on the government to promote a particular vi-
sion of free speech, to date this vision has not found widespread
acceptance.455
But even those embracing this alternative, more affirmative vi-
sion of free speech cannot simply give absolute priority to the interests
452 See Yoo, supra note 51, at 25.
453 CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973).
454 LESSIG, supra note 15, at 6.
455 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
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of those who wish to speak via the Internet.  Instead, they must still
take into account the important free speech values that intermediaries
promote.  Moreover, they should be careful not to be unduly swayed
by claims by particular parties that a particular intermediary’s deci-
sions have made it more difficult for them to speak.  Every exercise of
editorial discretion inevitably favors some speech over others.  In-
deed, that is the entire point, and undue limitations on intermediaries’
abilities to exercise their editorial discretion would prevent them from
making their own unique contributions to free speech.
